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REGULATING MANDATORY ARBITRATION 
 
Thomas V. Burch* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Mandatory arbitration is a recent phenomenon, and it poses a seemingly 
intractable problem. After the Supreme Court’s Southland Corp. v. Keating 
decision in 1984,1 companies increasingly began adding arbitration provisions to 
their consumer, employee, and franchisee agreements—often using those 
provisions to restrict or eliminate the nondrafting parties’ rights. While these 
provisions usually lacked bilateral consent, the Court instructed lower courts to 
allow their use, claiming that parties should have autonomy to negotiate the 
manner in which they resolve disputes.2 At the same time, the Court steadily 
expanded the Federal Arbitration Act’s scope, thereby increasing the number of 
mandatory arbitration agreements governed by the Act.3 The Court took these steps 
despite the evidence of mandatory arbitration’s negative effects on nondrafting 
parties’ rights.4 
Starting in the mid-1990s, however, consumers, employees, and franchisees 
began fighting the Court’s pro-arbitration mandate. In particular, they began asking 
lower courts to strike arbitration provisions under the unconscionability doctrine, 
and they began asking Congress to pass laws prohibiting mandatory arbitration for 
certain categories of disputes.5 While they achieved some early successes, the 
results of their efforts, overall, have been mixed.6 For example, when a number of 
lower courts began using the unconscionability doctrine to strike egregious 
arbitration provisions, the Supreme Court began limiting the doctrine’s use by 
shifting decision-making authority to arbitrators.7 And when Congress finally 
passed bills prohibiting mandatory arbitration, the bills applied to very narrow 
                                                 
* © 2011 Thomas V. Burch, Instructor, University of Georgia School of Law. Many 
thanks to Kristen Blankley, Curtis Bridgeman, Elizabeth Burch, Brannon Denning, and 
Margaret Moses for thoughts and comments on previous drafts. Thanks also to the 
participants at the ADR Works-in-Progress conference at the University of Oregon School 
of Law and the Labor & Employment Law Colloquium jointly hosted by the Washington 
University School of Law and the Saint Louis University School of Law. All errors, of 
course, are my own. 
1 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
2 See id. at 7–8. 
3 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
4 See infra notes 234–236, 251 and accompanying text. 
5 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
6 See discussion infra Part III.A–B. 
7 See, e.g., Rent-a-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2779 (2010) (limiting 
parties’ abilities to challenge arbitration clauses in court by finding that if parties assign the 
arbitrability question to the arbitrator through a delegation clause, arbitrators have the 
exclusive right to determine whether the agreement is unconscionable). 
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categories of disputes, providing little relief for the parties most frequently 
subjected to the mandatory-arbitration process.8 
Because of these mixed results, the mandatory arbitration debate has 
intensified over the last several years. Companies and courts are increasingly 
fighting to preserve it, claiming that mandatory arbitration lowers dispute-
resolution costs and reduces judicial caseloads.9 Consumers, employees, and 
franchisees, on the other hand, are increasingly fighting to eliminate it, claiming 
that it is an unfair process that restricts or eliminates fundamental individual 
rights.10 Both sides have compelling arguments, but neither side seems willing to 
acknowledge the merit of the other side’s argument and to compromise11—even 
though compromise seems to be the only workable approach. 
This Article proposes such a compromise: allow companies to mandate 
arbitration, but regulate the process to increase its fairness for the parties subjected 
to it. This will allow us to study mandatory arbitration over time while examining 
regulatory effects on its overall fairness, which is a goal-oriented, pragmatic 
approach to dealing with the mandatory arbitration problem. Accordingly, Part II 
begins by highlighting the Federal Arbitration Act’s history, both before and after 
Congress passed it in 1925.12 This history demonstrates how the Supreme Court 
has used formalistic reasoning to expand the Act beyond Congress’s original intent 
and indicates that the Act’s historical genesis justifies (at least partially) the end 
this Article seeks to achieve: improving mandatory arbitration’s fairness through 
regulation.13 In particular, the Act’s legislative history demonstrates that Congress 
wanted to protect individual rights against abuse from parties with greater 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010, H.R. 3326, 111th Cong. 
§ 8116 (2009) (prohibiting the government from contracting with employers that require 
arbitration of “any claim under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or any tort related 
to or arising out of sexual assault or harassment”); John Warner National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, H.R. 5122, 109th Cong. § 670 (2006) (exempting 
military personnel and their dependents from having to arbitrate consumer-credit disputes). 
9 See infra notes 23, 132, 216 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 241–243 and accompanying text. 
11 Compare TAYLOR LINCOLN & DAVID ARKUSH, PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE ARBITRATION 
DEBATE TRAP: HOW OPPONENTS OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY DISTORT THE DEBATE 
ON ARBITRATION (2008), and JOHN O’DONNELL, PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE ARBITRATION TRAP: 
HOW CREDIT CARD COMPANIES ENSNARE CONSUMERS (2007), with PETER B. RUTLEDGE, 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, ARBITRATION – A GOOD DEAL 
FOR CONSUMERS: A RESPONSE TO PUBLIC CITIZEN (2008). 
12 When Congress passed the Act in 1925, it was known as the United States 
Arbitration Act. It became the Federal Arbitration Act in 1947 when Congress reenacted 
and codified it as Title 9 of the U.S. Code. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 
500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991). For simplicity’s sake, I refer to it throughout as the Federal 
Arbitration Act. 
13 See Michael Sullivan & Daniel J. Solove, Can Pragmatism Be Radical? Richard 
Posner and Legal Pragmatism, 113 YALE L.J. 687, 703–04 (2003) (“Guiding ideals such as 
‘fairness,’ ‘justice,’ and ‘freedom’ must be critically examined by looking to past 
experience.”). 
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bargaining power,14 which, at the very least, is worth considering when deciding 
how to proceed in the mandatory arbitration debate. 
Part III explains the consumers’, employees’, and franchisees’ response to the 
Supreme Court’s expansion of the Act.15 Specifically, it addresses these groups’ 
use of the unconscionability doctrine, the Court’s recent limitation of that defense, 
and how that limitation leaves Congress as these groups’ last hope against 
mandatory arbitration. Part III also summarizes an original survey of the 139 anti-
arbitration bills introduced in Congress since 1995—the majority of which have 
proposed eliminating mandatory arbitration. Overall, this survey shows that the 
consumers, employees, and franchisees pushing these bills have taken a 
shortsighted approach that disregards mandatory arbitration’s public benefits and 
makes arbitration itself seem like the problem.  
Finally, Part IV critiques both the Supreme Court’s and the reform groups’ 
approaches to mandatory arbitration, finding that both are, among other things, too 
rigid. Part IV then offers a pragmatic, regulatory approach—one that rejects the 
Supreme Court’s idea that the Act is grounded in permanent, immutable principles 
as well as the reform groups’ position that eliminating mandatory arbitration is 
justified by a moral consensus regarding the enforcement of rights. This new 
approach attempts to balance companies’ needs against individuals’ rights, which 
is the best way to resolve the current discord surrounding the mandatory-
arbitration debate. 
 
II.  THE SUPREME COURT’S ARBITRATION FORMALISM 
 
Common law develops largely through judgments in litigated cases—even for 
laws founded in legislation.16 The result, too often, is bureaucratic formalism in 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., Bills to Make Valid and Enforceable Written Provisions or Agreements 
for Arbitration of Disputes Arising out of Contracts, Maritime Transactions, or Commerce 
Among the States or Territories or with Foreign Nations: Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and 
H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 14–15 (1924) 
[hereinafter 1924 Joint Hearings] (statements of Sen. Thomas Sterling, Chairman, 
Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary and Julius H. Cohen, General Counsel, New 
York State Chamber of Commerce); A Bill Relating to Sales and Contracts to Sell in 
Interstate Commerce; and a Bill to Make Valid and Enforceable Written Provisions or 
Agreements for Arbitration of Disputes Arising Out of Contracts, Maritime Transactions, 
or Commerce Among the States or Territories or with Foreign Nations: Hearing on S. 4213 
and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 9–10 
(1923) [hereinafter 1923 Hearings] (statements of Sen. Thomas J. Walsh and W.H.H. Piatt, 
Chairman, Committee of Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, American Bar 
Association). 
15 For the sake of simplicity, I will sometimes refer to these consumers, employees, 
and franchisees (and the advocacy groups working on their behalves) as the “reform 
groups” or the “reform advocates.” Specific examples of the advocacy groups include the 
National Association of Consumer Advocates, Public Citizen, Trial Lawyers for Public 
Justice, and the National Consumer Law Center, to name a few. 
16 IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW, at vii (1992). 
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judicial decisions.17 Courts choose a position and stick with it regardless of facts, 
circumstances, or events that might otherwise lead to a different outcome. And 
their written decisions “run in deductive form with an air or expression of single-
line inevitability.”18 
Such has been the case with the Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration 
Act. Starting in the 1980s, the Court adopted a “national policy favoring 
arbitration,”19 and it has since used that policy, coupled with the idea of party 
autonomy, to expand the Act’s scope beyond Congress’s original intent. Now the 
Act is applicable in both state and federal courts, it encompasses statutory and 
employment claims, and it applies to disputes between parties with unequal 
bargaining power—even if one party hasn’t truly consented to arbitrate.20 Congress 
intended none of these.21 In other words, the Court’s formalism has crafted a 
Federal Arbitration Act that bears little resemblance to the Act that Congress 
originally passed.22 
The Court stretched the Act so far by routinely distorting its legislative 
history. The following sections address the Act’s development before 1925, 
Congress’s intentions in passing it that year, and the Supreme Court’s subsequent, 
consistent refusal to heed Congress’s intent when interpreting it. Together, these 
sections illustrate the lengths to which the Court has gone to expand the Act and, 
correspondingly, aid in reducing judicial caseloads.23 
 
                                                 
17 See id. 
18 KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 38 (1960) 
(describing formalism’s ideology as follows: “the rules of law are to decide the cases; 
policy is for the legislature, not for the courts, and so is change even in pure common 
law”). “Single-line inevitability” refers to failure of courts to provide reasoning for their 
decisions.  
19 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (“In enacting § 2 of the federal 
Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of 
the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting 
parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”). 
20 Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a 
Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 99–100 
(2006) (stating that the Act “has been construed to preempt state law, eliminate the 
requirement of consent to arbitration, permit arbitration of statutory rights, and remove the 
jury trial right from citizens without their knowledge or consent”). 
21 See infra notes 52–72 and accompanying text. 
22 Moses, supra note 20, at 99–100 (stating that the Act as interpreted today by the 
Supreme Court probably would not have commanded any votes in the 1925 Congress). 
23 See MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 172 (“One cannot immerse oneself in the 
arbitration cases without coming to the conclusion that a major force driving the Court is 
docket-clearing pure and simple.”); see also Moses, supra note 20, at 156 (“These judicial 
policy choices appear to reflect the interest of the courts in reducing the judicial 
caseload.”). 
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A.  The Federal Arbitration Act’s Development 
 
Arbitration was not integral to early social or economic development in the 
United States.24 In fact, although the first arbitration tribunal convened in 1786 in 
New York,25 another 134 years passed before the practice gained widespread 
acceptance. That began when New York passed the first modern arbitration statute 
in 1920.26 
New York, not surprisingly, figured prominently in arbitration’s 
development.27 It was the country’s largest commercial center and its courts were 
backlogged with business disputes.28 Those businesses wanted a more efficient, 
less-expensive method for resolving their differences—one that would help 
preserve business relationships by avoiding protracted, expensive delays in 
courts.29 Arbitration met those needs, but the original system wasn’t perfect. 
Specifically, neither the common law nor any of the states’ early arbitration 
statutes would enforce predispute arbitration agreements.30 Either party to a dispute 
could opt out of arbitration and compel the other to litigate the claim.31 
                                                 
24 FRANCES KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS AND 
ACHIEVEMENTS 6 (1948) (“It did not become an integral part of the early social and 
economic development of the country nor a recognized institution of any consequence and 
its impact was negligible upon the growth of justice in the country.”). 
25 Id. at 4. 
26 Id. at 9–11 (calling the New York statute a “revolutionary step”); CAMERON K. 
WEHRINGER, ARBITRATION PRECEPTS AND PRINCIPLES 5 (1969). 
27 See generally KELLOR, supra note 24 at 3–21; see also MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 
15, 25 (stating that arbitration was “neither a new nor an uncommon practice in the United 
States” at the turn of the twentieth century and that “New York had long been a center of 
arbitration activity”). 
28 In 1923, for example, the New York Supreme Court was three years behind on its 
docket. See 1924 Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 26 (statement of Alexander Rose, 
Representative, Arbitration Society of America). 
29 Moses, supra note 20, at 103 (“Businessmen needed solutions that were simpler, 
faster, and cheaper.”). In fact, it appears that arbitration advocates at the time did not see 
arbitration as a form of litigation. See JULIUS H. COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND 
THE LAW 10–23 (1918) (explaining arbitration as a way to avoid “unnecessary litigation”). 
30 Julius H. Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. 
REV. 265, 265 (1926) (“By this Act there is reversed the hoary doctrine that agreements for 
arbitration are revocable at will and are unenforceable, and in the language of the statute 
itself, they are made ‘valid, enforceable and irrevocable’ within the limits of Federal 
jurisdiction.”). There were some exceptions to this general rule, but the problems the rule 
created were big enough to lead to the reform movement, which led to Congress passing 
the FAA, which made all pre-dispute arbitration agreements presumptively valid. See also 
MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 20–21. 
31 A party could opt out even after the arbitration had started. And while opting out 
would be considered a breach of contract, for which damages were available, suits to 
collect such damages were ineffective. MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 20; see also WESLEY A. 
STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND AWARDS 82 (1930) (“Statements . . . 
frequently appear to the effect that a party who is aggrieved by the breach of such an 
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Courts allowed this “opting out” for two reasons. First, they wanted to protect 
parties with little bargaining power.32 Second, it was a holdover from English 
common law when courts zealously protected their jurisdiction.33 The American 
courts tended to follow suit, apparently feeling constrained by the English courts’ 
longstanding decisions.34 This resulted in decreased certainty over where disputes 
would be resolved.35 If either party believed it had a technical advantage in 
avoiding arbitration (e.g., the expected delay in court, the application of a 
particular procedural rule, or the right to greater discovery), that party was free to 
ignore the arbitration agreement and litigate the claim in court.36 
These problems led to the arbitration reform movement that started shortly 
after the turn of the twentieth century.37 Julius Cohen and Charles Bernheimer 
shepherded the movement,38 and passing New York’s modern arbitration statute 
                                                 
agreement can maintain an action for damages. So few cases, however, have involved such 
an action that if there is such a rule of law it rests upon this popular acclaim.”). 
32 1924 Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 15 (statement of Julius H. Cohen, General 
Counsel, New York State Chamber of Commerce) (“[A]t the time this rule was made 
people were not able to take care of themselves in making contracts, and the stronger men 
would take advantage of the weaker, and the courts had to come in and protect them”). 
33 Cohen & Dayton, supra note 30, at 283 (“The explanation is to be found in our 
English system of jurisprudence. For many centuries there has been established a rule, 
rooted originally in the jealousy of courts for their jurisdiction, that parties might not, by 
their agreement, oust the jurisdiction of the courts.”). 
34 Id. at 270; see also H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 2 (1924) (“The courts have felt that the 
precedent was too strongly fixed to be overturned without legislative enactment, although 
they have frequently criticised the rule and recognized its illogical nature and the injustice 
which results from it.”). Apparently there were English courts questioning the soundness of 
this rule, but American courts either glossed over or ignored those decisions. See COHEN, 
supra note 29, at 226–241 (explaining how the English rule of revocability was adopted by 
American courts). 
35 Cohen & Dayton, supra note 30, at 270. 
36 Id. (“The result is that this party is usually loath to surrender his supposed 
advantage.”). 
37 MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 25, 28–30, 38 (describing the elimination of the rule of 
revocability as the reformers’ “quest” and calling Cohen’s 1918 book the “kickoff” of the 
campaign to educate the public on arbitration); COHEN, supra note 29, at 53–252 
(dedicating the majority of the book to explaining why the doctrine of revocability was a 
“judicial error”). 
38 See MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 28 (recognizing Bernheimer and Cohen as the 
founders of the reform movement); Moses, supra note 20, at 101–11 (calling Cohen and 
Bernheimer “instrumental” in passing New York’s modern statute and then detailing their 
involvement in passing the Federal Arbitration Act). Although Cohen and Bernheimer 
shepherded the movement, several others were influential in the movement as well. For 
example, W.H.H. Piatt, chairman of an ABA committee on arbitration, lobbied for the 
FAA. MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 88. Also, the Arbitration Society of America was 
instrumental in pushing for federal reform. KELLOR, supra note 24, at 13. 
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was their first major success.39 They used this success to lobby Congress for a 
federal law that would make arbitration agreements enforceable in federal court.40 
They wanted to ensure that New York parties, for example, could compel parties 
from other states to arbitrate (assuming they had a valid agreement).41 
Cohen wrote the first draft of the Federal Arbitration Act in 1921, basing it 
largely on New York’s 1920 statute.42 He submitted it to the American Bar 
Association (ABA) for approval, but it lacked certain procedural provisions (which 
New York provided in its civil procedure code) so the ABA did not approve it.43 
Cohen fixed the problem and submitted a second draft in 1922, which the ABA 
approved. Senator Sterling and Congressman Mills then introduced it in each 
house of Congress,44 but their bills went no further than the Senate and House 
judiciary committees.45 So the ABA approved another draft in 1923 that 
incorporated Congressional comments from the previous session.46 Sterling and 
Mills introduced this draft to Congress in December 1923,47 subcommittees from 
each house’s judiciary committee held a joint hearing in January 1924,48 and 
Congress ultimately approved this draft (with minor changes) in February 1925.49 
President Coolidge signed it shortly thereafter,50 and it became effective on 
January 1, 1926.51 
 
                                                 
39 MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 28–31. New York’s new law led to the creation of the 
Arbitration Society of America in 1922, which was the “first permanent independent 
institution of arbitration.” KELLOR, supra note 24, at 11. It later merged (in 1926) with the 
Arbitration Foundation to become the American Arbitration Association. Id. at 15–17. The 
American Arbitration Association institutionalized arbitration “by giving it a central 
administrative organization, facilities for research and education, a laboratory for 
experiment, and a national system of tribunals.” Id. at 25. 
40 See Moses, supra note 20, at 101–02. 
41 Id. 
42 MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 85–86. One of the main differences was that the 
proposed Federal Arbitration Act appeared to allow oral agreements to arbitrate future 
disputes. Id. at 85. The fact that this provision was later stricken shows that the drafters and 
legislators were concerned about parties’ consent to arbitrate. 
43 Id. at 85–87. 
44 Id. at 88. 
45 Id. at 88–91. The House Judiciary Committee never held a hearing. Id. at 91. The 
Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing in January 1923. See 1923 Hearings, supra note 
14, at 1. 
46 MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 91. 
47 Id. at 92. 
48 See 1924 Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 1. 
49 The House passed the Act on June 6, 1924. The Senate passed it on January 31, 
1925. The House then considered and passed the Senate’s amendments on February 4, 
1925. MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 100–01. For a copy of the Act as passed by Congress in 
1925, see STURGES, supra note 31, at 983. 
50 Coolidge signed the Act on February 12, 1925. MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 101. 
51 Moses, supra note 20, at 110. 
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B.  Congress’s Intentions in Passing the Federal Arbitration Act 
 
When asked in 1923 to state the Federal Arbitration Act’s purpose, 
Bernheimer said it would: (1) reduce consumer costs; (2) reduce court delays; (3) 
save time and money for the disputants; (4) preserve business relationships; and (5) 
simply enforce voluntary agreements to arbitrate disputes.52 Similar comments 
between 1921 and 1926 on the Act’s purposes were common from legislators and 
other reform advocates,53 and they provide great insight into what Congress 
intended in passing the Act.54 
First, the comments demonstrate that Congress passed the Act as a procedural 
mechanism for enforcing arbitration agreements in federal, not state, courts. 
Cohen, for example, submitted a brief at the 1924 joint hearings supporting this 
idea: “The statute as drawn establishes a procedure in the Federal courts for the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements. It rests upon the constitutional provision by 
which Congress is authorized to establish and control inferior Federal courts.”55 
Although there was little testimony on this topic during the hearing,56 the House 
Committee Report confirmed Cohen’s position by stating: 
 
The matter is properly the subject of Federal action. Whether an 
agreement for arbitration shall be enforced or not is a question of 
                                                 
52 MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 29–30 (citing Report of the Standing Committee on 
Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law, 47 ANN. REP. ABA 279 app. b at 300 (1924)). I 
want to emphasize the portion of Bernheimer’s comments on the voluntary nature of 
arbitration. Specifically, he said: “It is voluntary. No one need agree to arbitrate unless it is 
his wish.” Id. at 30. 
53 See, e.g., Bernheimer himself reiterated the same basic comments at the Joint 
Hearings in 1924. 1924 Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 7 (statement of Charles L. 
Bernheimer, Chairman, Comm. on Arbitration, New York State Chamber of Commerce) 
(“It raises business standards. It maintains business honor, prevents unnecessary litigation, 
and eliminates the law’s delay by relieving our courts.”). 
54 Part of the reason that comments from the reform advocates are so important in 
interpreting the intent of the Act is that much of the debate over the Act took place between 
those advocates before the ABA, not before Congress. Congress basically adopted the Act 
as provided to it by the ABA. See MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 107–09. 
55 1924 Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 37 (brief submitted by Julius H. Cohen, 
General Counsel, New York State Chamber of Commerce). Senator Sterling accepted the 
brief into the record without objection. Id. at 33. Cohen reiterated this intent in his 1926 
article in the Virginia Law Review. See Cohen & Dayton, supra note 30, at 275–76 (“[The 
statute] rests upon the constitutional provision by which Congress is authorized to establish 
and control inferior Federal courts. . . . The statute as drawn establishes a procedure in the 
Federal courts for the enforcement of certain arbitration agreements.”). 
56 Senator Sterling and Representative Dyer had a brief exchange on “the authority of 
Congress to legislate on this subject” with Sterling agreeing that Congress had “ample” 
authority and jurisdiction. See 1924 Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 24 (statements of 
Sen. Thomas Sterling, Chairman, Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, and Rep. 
Leonidas C. Dyer, Chairman, Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary). 
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procedure to be determined by the law court in which the proceeding is 
brought and not one of substantive law to be determined by the law of 
the forum in which the contract is made. Before such contracts could be 
enforced in the Federal courts, therefore, this law is essential.57 
 
Further confirming this limit on the Act’s scope, Cohen, Bernheimer, and others 
were pushing the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(NCCUSL) for an arbitration act that states could adopt to make predispute 
arbitration agreements enforceable in state courts.58 If the reformers believed that 
the Federal Arbitration Act would be applicable in state courts, their efforts before 
the NCCUSL would have been unnecessary.59 
Second, the legislators’ and reform advocates’ comments during this period 
reveal that Congress intended the Federal Arbitration Act to apply to arbitration 
agreements between businesses with relatively equal bargaining power—not 
agreements between businesses and their employees or consumers. For example, 
take Bernheimer’s 1923 comments to the ABA where he said that the Act would 
“preserve business friendships” and that it would apply only to “voluntary” 
agreements.60 While these comments do not explicitly limit the Act to arbitration 
                                                 
57 H.R. REP. NO. 68–96, at 1 (1924). While the report says that the Act “is founded 
also upon the Federal control over interstate commerce and over admiralty,” this 
justification was secondary, at best. Id.; see also Moses, supra note 20, at 110 (“By use of 
the word ‘also,’ the reference to the commerce and admiralty power appears to be a fall-
back position, a secondary basis of power.”). Cohen seemed to think that Congress’s power 
over federal courts was the main, if not the sole, authority for passing the Act. See Cohen & 
Dayton, supra note 30, at 275 (“It has been suggested that the proposed law depends 
entirely for its validity upon the exercise of the interstate-commerce and admiralty powers 
of Congress. This is not the fact. . . . It rests upon the constitutional provision by which 
Congress is authorized to establish and control inferior Federal courts.”); 1924 Joint 
Hearings, supra note 14, at 37 (brief submitted by Julius H. Cohen, General Counsel, New 
York State Chamber of Commerce). 
58 See Moses, supra note 20, at 102. The NCCUSL passed the Uniform Arbitration 
Act in 1925. See STURGES, supra note 31, at 957. 
59 Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s 
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 649–50 (1996) (“The fact that 
the same groups that sought passage of the FAA were working simultaneously on state 
laws that would have been superfluous if the FAA were truly intended to govern the state 
forum as well as the federal bolsters this conclusion.”). The idea that the Act was intended 
to apply in federal courts is further supported by its repeated references to “federal courts.” 
MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 106–07 (“Either the ABA and Congress were being 
extraordinarily dense in failing to recognize that those references should be to all courts, or 
they meant exactly what they said when they referred only to federal courts.”). 
60 See MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 30 (citing Report of the Standing Committee on 
Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law, 47 ANN. REP. ABA 279 app. b at 300 (1924)); 
see also 1924 Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 7 (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer, 
Chairman, Committee on Arbitration, New York State Chamber of Commerce) (“It 
preserves business relationships.”). 
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agreements covering business-to-business disputes,61 they strongly imply as much 
because they responded to existing and anticipated questions over whether the Act 
would apply to adhesive contracts.62 Also, at the 1923 Hearing before the Senate 
Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, Senator Walsh expressed 
concerns over take-it-or-leave-it arbitration agreements,63 and Senator Sterling 
expressed similar concerns at the 1924 Joint Hearings.64 On both occasions, the 
persons being questioned assured the senators that the reformers did not intend to 
apply the Act to adhesive agreements.65 Their statements, along with similar 
statements made by other reform advocates,66 show that the reformers drafted, and 
                                                 
61 One could argue, for example, that a relationship between a business and a 
customer is a “business friendship” and that customers “voluntarily” sign binding 
arbitration agreements despite any disparity in bargaining power or lack of choice. I would 
disagree with such an argument, of course, but I recognize that it could be made.  
62 This issue was raised perhaps most fervently in arguments before the NCCUSL and 
the ABA over whether the proposed Uniform Arbitration Act that would apply in state 
courts should cover pre-dispute arbitration agreements. See MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 
49–54 (quoting statements made by Joseph Francis O’Connell, who, in summarizing the 
feelings of the NCCUSL’s arbitration committee, expressed concern over individuals 
“giving up rights that the American people really regard as sacred” by signing adhesive 
agreements to arbitrate disputes). Because of this concern, the NCCUSL excluded pre-
dispute agreements from UAA coverage and the ABA subsequently approved this non-
modern version of that Act. Id. at 54. 
63 1923 Hearings, supra note 14, at 9 (statement of Sen. Thomas J. Walsh). Prior to 
Senator Walsh’s comments, W.H.H. Piatt raised the issue on his own with regard to 
employment agreements. To alleviate any concerns that the Act would allow employers to 
force employees into arbitration, Mr. Piatt said: “It is not intended that this shall be an act 
referring to labor disputes, at all.” Id. (statements of W.H.H. Piatt, Chairman, Committee of 
Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law, American Bar Association). 
64 1924 Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 15 (statement of Sen. Thomas Sterling, 
Chairman, Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary). 
65 Id. (statement of Julius H. Cohen, General Counsel, New York State Chamber of 
Commerce) (attempting to assure Senator Sterling that the Act was not intended to apply to 
adhesive contracts); 1923 Hearings, supra note 14, at 10 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt, 
Chairman, Committee of Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, American Bar 
Association) (“Speaking for myself, personally, I would say I would not favor any kind of 
legislation that would permit the forcing a man to sign that kind of a contract.”). 
66 See, e.g., 1924 Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 26 (statement of Alexander Rose, 
Representative, Arbitration Society of America) (“It is only the idea that arbitration may 
now have the aid of the court to enforce these provisions which men voluntarily enter 
into.”); Cohen & Dayton, supra note 30, at 279 (“No one is required to make an agreement 
to arbitrate. Such action by a party is entirely voluntary.”). In the early years of the Federal 
Arbitration Act, arbitration under the Act remained a voluntary process. See KELLOR, supra 
note 24, at 168 (“The voluntary nature of arbitration as an American policy has been 
steadily maintained.”). 
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that Congress intended to pass, an Act that applied to arbitration agreements 
between merchants with relatively equal bargaining power.67 
Finally, the reform advocates’ comments demonstrate that they did not intend 
for the Act to apply to statutory or employment disputes. Cohen, for example, 
stated that arbitration “is not the proper method for deciding points of law of major 
importance involving . . . the application of statutes.”68 According to Cohen, those 
questions were better reserved for “skilled judges” and “established systems of 
law.”69 And W. H. H. Piatt stated that the Act was not intended to apply to 
employment disputes “at all.”70 In fact, the reformers envisioned the Act applying 
only to “trade disputes” between merchants involving factual questions and 
“simpler questions of law.”71 This meshed with their view of the Act’s limited 
scope and with how courts applied the Act in the early years after Congress passed 
it.72 But this view would not survive very long. The Supreme Court soon began 
expanding the Act far beyond its original scope—ignoring Congressional intent, 
and the reform advocates’ intent, along the way. 
 
C.  The Court’s Steady Expansion of the Federal Arbitration Act’s Scope 
 
Although the Federal Arbitration Act started as a procedural statute applicable 
in federal courts to agreements between merchants, the Supreme Court eventually 
transformed it into a substantive law statute that applied in both federal and state 
courts and to agreements between merchants and individuals. The process started 
in 1938 with Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, a case that on its surface had nothing 
to do with arbitration.73 And it has continued over the last seventy-plus years 
                                                 
67 See Cohen & Dayton, supra note 30, at 281 (“[Arbitration] is a remedy peculiarly 
suited to the disposition of the ordinary disputes between merchants as to questions of 
fact—quantity, quality, time of delivery, compliance with terms of payment, excuses for 
non-performance, and the like.”); Moses, supra note 20, at 108 (“The new law was not 
intended to permit a party with greater economic strength to compel a weaker party to 
arbitrate.”); Sternlight, supra note 59, at 641 (“When Congress passed the FAA in 1925, it 
intended only to require federal courts to accept arbitration agreements that had been 
voluntarily entered into by two parties of relatively equal bargaining power in arms’ length 
transactions.”). 
68 Cohen & Dayton, supra note 30, at 281. 
69 Id. Although Cohen did not make this argument before Congress, it is consistent 
with his position before Congress that the Act was limited in scope, applying mainly to 
factual disputes between merchants. See Moses, supra note 20, at 111. 
70 1923 Hearings, supra note 14, at 9 (statements of W.H.H. Piatt, Chairman, 
Committee of Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law, American Bar Association). 
71 See 1924 Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 7 (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer, 
Chairman, Committee on Arbitration, New York State Chamber of Commerce); Cohen & 
Dayton, supra note 30, at 281. 
72 See MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 122–33. 
73 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
1320 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4 
through a series of Supreme Court decisions that, collectively, show how the Court 
has legislated a new Act—one that Congress did not envision.74 
In Erie the Court overturned Swift v. Tyson75 and held that federal courts must 
apply state substantive law in diversity cases.76 Because the Act was intended to be 
procedural, at first Erie had no effect on it.77 But that began to change in 1945 with 
the Court’s decision in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York.78 There, the Court found that in 
determining whether to apply state or federal law in diversity cases, courts should 
focus less on whether a law is substantive or procedural and more on whether 
applying federal law would lead to a different outcome.79 Under this “outcome 
determinative” test, state law applied if the federal law would lead to a different 
result.80 This raised the question of whether compelling arbitration under the Act 
could be outcome determinative. 
The Court first faced this question in 1956 in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of 
America,81 a case involving the breach of an employment contract made in New 
York and carried out in Vermont.82 The contract required the parties to arbitrate 
their disputes before the American Arbitration Association in New York, but 
Bernhardt sued in a Vermont state court.83 At the time, Vermont did not enforce 
predispute arbitration agreements,84 so Polygraphic removed the case to federal 
court in Vermont, asking it to stay the litigation and compel arbitration. The 
district court denied the stay; the court of appeals reversed; and the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari because of the court of appeals’ “doubtful application” of Erie.85 
Bernhardt held that the Act did not apply in diversity cases involving 
intrastate commerce.86 And because the Court found that this case did, in fact, 
involve intrastate commerce, it could have stopped its opinion there.87 But it 
                                                 
74 See Moses, supra note 20, at 114–54; see also MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 144 
(describing Justice Stevens’ opinion in Southland as “an unusually frank recognition of the 
ongoing legislative role of the Court in amending legislation over time”). 
75 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
76 Erie R.R. Co., 304 U.S. at 77–78. 
77 MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 134 (“The [FAA] was a statute aimed at governing the 
procedure in federal courts, not the substantive law those courts applied. The act did not 
therefore depend upon the continuing validity of Swift.”). 
78 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
79 Id. at 110. 
80 Id. at 109–11. 
81 350 U.S. 198 (1956). 
82 Id. at 199. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 199–200. 
85 Id. at 200. 
86 Id. at 202 (“We conclude that the stay provided in § 3 reaches only those contracts 
covered by §§ 1 and 2.”). 
87 Id. at 200–01 (“There is no showing that petitioner while performing his duties 
under the employment contract was working ‘in’ commerce, was producing goods for 
commerce, or was engaging in activity that affected commerce, within the meaning of our 
decisions.”). 
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continued, in dicta, to address whether compelling arbitration could be outcome-
determinative, ultimately finding that it could.88 Specifically, the Court said “If the 
federal court allows arbitration where the state court would disallow it, the 
outcome of litigation might depend on the courthouse where suit is brought. For 
the remedy by arbitration, whatever its merits or shortcomings, substantially 
affects the cause of action created by the State.”89 Put differently, the Act was 
more than just a procedural statute to be applied in federal court; it was a 
substantive measure that could affect a dispute’s outcome.90 Reaching this 
conclusion increased the chances that the Court might, in a future case, find that 
the Act was “substantive in the full-blown regulatory sense that would lead to 
invocation of the Supremacy Clause.”91 And that was what began to happen in 
1967 with Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.92 
In Prima Paint, a diversity case involving interstate commerce, the Court had 
to decide whether a court or an arbitrator should hear a fraudulent inducement 
claim.93 This presented a dilemma under Guaranty Trust Co.’s outcome-
determinative test: if the Court accepted Bernhardt’s reasoning that arbitration 
“substantially affects the cause of action created by the State,”94 then it would have 
to find that the Act did not apply in diversity cases because it was “substantive” 
under Erie. This would directly contradict Congress’s original reason for passing 
the Act.95 So, without deciding whether applying state law would lead to a 
different outcome,96 the Court simply applied the Act and allowed the arbitrator to 
resolve the claim.97 To support its conclusion, the Court said: “[I]t is clear beyond 
                                                 
88 Id. at 203. The Court cited the following as reasons why arbitration might lead to a 
different result: (1) no right to trial by jury; (2) arbitrators not having “the benefit of 
judicial instruction on the law”; (3) no reasoned opinions; (4) limited record; and (5) 
limited review of awards. Id. 
89 Id. This conclusion appeared to mean that when state arbitration law and the Act 
conflicted in diversity cases, federal courts would have to apply state law under the 
Guaranty Trust Co. test, thus possibly limiting the Act to federal question cases. Such a 
limitation would have been problematic given that the Act was passed to enforce 
arbitration agreements in diversity cases. See Moses, supra note 20, at 115–16. But because 
this discussion was dicta, the question would be reserved for a future case. Also, I should 
note that Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion, actually called for the Act not to be 
applicable in diversity cases. See Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 207–08 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
90 See Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 203. 
91 MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 137. 
92 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
93 Id. at 402. 
94 Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 203. 
95 Moses, supra note 20, at 117. 
96 Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 400 n.3. 
97 Id. at 403–04. In doing so the Court eliminated any doubt over whether the Act 
applied in diversity cases involving interstate commerce. See MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 
138. The Prima Paint decision created what is known as the “separability rule.” Under this 
rule, challenges to agreements as a whole are for the arbitrator to decide. And specific 
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dispute that the federal arbitration statute is based upon and confined to the 
incontestable federal foundations of ‘control over interstate commerce and over 
admiralty.’”98 But nothing in the Act’s legislative history supports this.99 And, 
because the Court didn’t specify that Congress never intended the Act to apply in 
state courts, its reliance on the Commerce Clause100 invented a basis for arguing 
that the Act created substantive rights that would preempt conflicting state laws.101 
This made it “logically inescapable” that the Act would eventually apply in state, 
not just federal, court.102 And that is precisely what the Court did in Southland 
Corp. v. Keating in 1984.103 
In Southland, the Court finally (and erroneously) described the Act as a 
substantive federal law that would trump conflicting state laws in state court.104 
Southland thus divorced the Act from its legislative history and freed the Court to 
create an Act of its choosing.105 To help in that creation, the Court relied on its 
recently created “national policy favoring arbitration.”106 This soon became one of 
the Court’s key justifications for further expanding the Act to (1) cover statutory 
disputes and employment agreements, (2) preempt state consumer-protection laws, 
and (3) eliminate arbitration’s consent requirement.107 
For example, the following year in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,108 the Court cited its national policy and found that 
                                                 
challenges to arbitration clauses are reserved for the courts. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 
403–04. 
98 Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405. The Court also said that the admiralty and commerce 
powers “formed the principal bases of the legislation” and that Congress’s power over 
federal courts, if relied on at all, was “supplementary.” Id. at 405 n.13. 
99 See supra Part I.B. 
100 Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405; see also Moses, supra note 20, at 121–22. 
101 Moses, supra note 20, at 121–22. 
102 MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 138. 
103 465 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1984). The Court foreshadowed this result one year earlier in 
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983). There, in dicta, 
the Court said: (1) that Congress, through the Act, created a body of substantive federal law 
that governed in either state or federal court; and (2) that Congress, through the Act, 
created a liberal federal policy in favor of arbitration. Id. at 24. Neither statement is 
supported by legislative history. 
104 465 U.S. at 11–12 (stating that the Act “rests on the authority of Congress to enact 
substantive rules under the Commerce Clause” and that passing the Act under the 
Commerce Clause “clearly implied that the substantive rules of the Act were to apply in 
state as well as federal courts”). 
105 Moses, supra note 20, at 130, 149. 
106 Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 10. The Court first announced this policy one year 
earlier in dicta in Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24. The national policy had no 
basis in the Act’s legislative history. Moses, supra note 20, at 123 (“The 1925 Congress 
never indicated in the slightest way that arbitration was to be favored over judicial 
resolution of disputes.”). 
107 Moses, supra note 20, at 99–100. 
108 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
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arbitration was an appropriate forum for resolving statutory disputes.109 To support 
its decision, it said: “[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not 
forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their 
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”110 But this statement 
directly contradicted Julius Cohen’s earlier limiting statements111 and the 
Bernhardt Court’s skepticism toward arbitration.112 The Court swept aside these 
concerns, stating simply, “we are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the 
desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the 
development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution.”113 
The Court then continued its proarbitration trend in Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,114 a 1991 decision where it held that ADEA claims 
are arbitrable.115 It did so despite its prior statement in Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co.116 that “[a]rbitral procedures, while well suited to the resolution of 
contractual disputes, make arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the 
final resolution of rights created by Title VII.”117 The Gilmer Court also addressed, 
in a footnote, whether employment disputes can be arbitrated.118 The Court 
                                                 
109 Id. at 626–27. The claims in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. arose under the Sherman 
Act. Id. at 616. The Court would later expand the Act to cover other statutory disputes as 
well. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991) (finding 
that ADEA claims are subject to mandatory arbitration). 
110 Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628. 
111 Cohen & Dayton, supra note 30, at 281 (stating that arbitration “is not the proper 
method for deciding points of law of major importance involving constitutional questions 
or policy in the application of statutes” and that such questions are better reserved for 
“skilled judges”). Cohen admittedly was not a member of Congress when Congress passed 
the Act, but he did draft the Act and testify about its meaning before Congress, which is 
why I place importance on his statements. 
112 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956) (“[T]he remedy by 
arbitration, whatever its merits or shortcomings, substantially affects the cause of action 
created by the State.”). 
113 Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 626–27. The Court confirmed this view in 
1987 in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (“This 
duty to enforce arbitration agreements is not diminished when a party bound by an 
agreement raises a claim founded on statutory rights.”). The Court also said that the party 
trying to avoid arbitration has the burden of showing that Congress did not intend for the 
statutory claims in question to be arbitrated. Id. at 226–27. 
114 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
115 Id. at 35. 
116 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
117 Id. at 56. 
118 Specifically, it asked whether Gilmer could avoid arbitration under the Act 
because of Section 1’s exclusion of “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad 
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” 
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2; see also 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). Gilmer had signed an industry-
wide “securities registration application” that mandated arbitration of any disputes between 
himself and his employer, Interstate. Id. at 25 n.2. After being fired, Gilmer sued Interstate 
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ultimately sidestepped the question with thin reasoning,119 which foreshadowed its 
subsequent decision in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.120 There, it explicitly 
held that the Act covers disputes between employers and employees,121 despite W. 
H. H. Piatt’s assurance at the 1923 hearing that it was not “an act referring to labor 
disputes at all.”122 
Cases like Mitsubishi Motors and Gilmer exhibited the Court’s belief that 
arbitration was an appropriate forum for resolving most disputes. Its next major 
step was to increase the number of disputes potentially falling within the Federal 
Arbitration Act’s scope. In 1995, in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,123 the 
Court found that Section 2’s coverage of contracts “evidencing a transaction 
involving commerce” reached the limits of Congress’s Commerce Clause 
powers.124 In other words, the Court adopted the broadest possible definition of 
“involving commerce,” meaning that the Act would apply to all “commerce in 
fact.”125 This reading of the phrase reduced the likelihood that disputes would be 
covered by state arbitration acts instead of the Federal Arbitration Act, thus 
pushing the Act “further into the realm of state court jurisprudence.”126 
Then, the following year in Doctor’s Associates v. Casarotto,127 the Court 
severely restricted states’ abilities to pass laws regulating arbitration covered by 
the Act.128 Specifically, the Court found that lower courts could not “invalidate 
arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to arbitration 
provisions.”129 This meant that state legislatures could protect consumers and 
others from mandatory arbitration only through laws dealing with purely local 
                                                 
for age discrimination in a federal district court. Id. at 23. Interstate then moved to compel 
arbitration under the “application.” Id. at 23–24. 
119 The Court sidestepped the question by finding that the industry-wide “securities 
registration application” signed by Gilmer was neither an employment contract nor part of 
an employment contract. Id. at 25 n.2. 
120 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
121 Id. at 123–24. 
122 Id. at 127; see also 1923 Hearings, supra note 14, at 9 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt, 
Chairman, Committee of Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law, American Bar 
Association). The Court explicitly refused to consider the Act’s legislative history. Circuit 
City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 119. It based its decision on the text of Section 1, stating that 
the text was clear. Id. at 114–15. Never mind that it applied the principle of ejusdem 
generis, which typically is used only if the text doesn’t give a direct answer. 
123 513 U.S. 265 (1995).  
124 Id. at 268 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2). 
125 Id. at 281 (“[W]e accept the ‘commerce in fact’ interpretation, reading the Act’s 
language as insisting that the ‘transaction’ in fact ‘involv[e]’ interstate commerce, even if 
the parties did not contemplate an interstate commerce connection.”). 
126 Sternlight, supra note 59, at 665. 
127 517 U.S. 681 (1996). 
128 Id. at 687. 
129 Id.  
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transactions or through laws dealing with contracts generally.130 In other words, the 
Court had further frustrated states’ abilities to protect consumers from 
overreaching arbitration agreements because Allied-Bruce left relatively few 
arbitration disputes outside the scope of the Act. 
Overall, the Court’s opinions—including some of its more recent ones131—
demonstrate that it will compel arbitration despite conflicting precedent, contrary 
legislative history, or other concerns about arbitration in any particular case (e.g., 
disparities in bargaining power132). Its reasoning appears to be based on a desire to 
reduce judicial caseloads—a worthy goal no doubt.133 But whether that goal should 
trump concerns over the loss of individual rights through mandatory arbitration 
remains an open question—one that consumers, employees, and franchisees are 
increasingly urging lower courts and Congress to address. 
 
III.  THE RISING LIBERAL RESPONSE TO MANDATORY ARBITRATION 
 
As the Supreme Court expanded the Federal Arbitration Act’s scope and 
simultaneously required lower courts to grant greater deference to parties’ 
arbitration agreements, the parties drafting these agreements increasingly included 
unfair and overreaching terms. State legislatures could do little about this after 
Doctor’s Associates.134 This left parties with two basic methods to seek relief from 
unfair agreements: (1) through the unconscionability doctrine in lower courts and 
(2) through Congress. 
The unconscionability doctrine, when applied, allows parties to avoid the 
most oppressive mandatory arbitration agreements. But it does not provide wide-
scale relief; it simply allows courts to review agreements on a case-by-case 
basis.135 That is why advocates for eliminating mandatory arbitration have asked 
                                                 
130 See Sternlight, supra note 59, at 668. After Allied-Bruce, fewer arbitration disputes 
were considered local disputes. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 256, 
281 (1995). 
131 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) 
(upholding a class action waiver in an arbitration agreement); Rent-a-Ctr., W., Inc. v. 
Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2781 (2010) (limiting nondrafting parties’ ability to have the 
arbitrability question decided by courts instead of arbitrators). 
132 See, e.g., Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 229–30 
(1987) (finding the voluntariness of an agreement irrelevant to the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements). 
133 MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 172 (“[T]he Court is motivated to reduce the cases 
having to be tried by the judicial system, particularly the federal judicial system.”). 
134 See Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (holding that arbitration 
agreements could not be invalidated by state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions). 
135 Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the 
Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1442 (2008) 
(“[U]nconscionability does not completely address the problem: Many of the features of 
arbitration clauses that are often challenged as unconscionable really do not strike one as a 
gross imposition on the particular person at issue but rather strike at more broadly based 
considerations of public policy.”). 
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Congress for protection.136 They want Congress to preclude companies from 
requiring their customers, employees, and franchisees to arbitrate disputes. 
This section explores those parties’ increased reliance on the 
unconscionability doctrine after Doctor’s Associates and the Supreme Court’s 
most recent attempts to limit the doctrine’s use. It also addresses these parties’ 
efforts in Congress during this period, showing that their efforts have increased in 
lockstep with their reliance on the unconscionability doctrine. So far neither 
Congress nor the unconscionability doctrine has produced the results that these 
reform advocates want—mandatory arbitration’s wholesale elimination. But that 
could change as they continue pressing for relief. 
 
A.  The Rise (and Ultimate Fall) of Unconscionability 
 
Section 2 of the Act allows courts to invalidate arbitration agreements “upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”137 Put 
differently, courts may invalidate arbitration agreements under general state laws 
that would make any contract unenforceable.138 “Unconscionability” is one such 
law. 
Although the unconscionability doctrine is at least two and a half centuries 
old, courts have not yet agreed on how to define it.139 In part, this is because it 
requires a fact-based inquiry, the results of which will vary from case to case.140 
Nevertheless, courts have developed a two-part test for applying the doctrine. First, 
the party challenging the arbitration agreement must prove that the manner in 
which it was asked to arbitrate was somehow unfair (e.g., through an adhesion 
                                                 
136 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 
4173, 111th Cong. § 748(n)(1)–(2) (2010) (giving a proposed agency the power to prohibit 
or impose limitations of mandatory arbitration by rule if the agency decides such a rule 
would benefit the public interest). 
137 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
138 See Bruhl, supra note 135, at 1422. 
139 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The 
Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 757, 792–94 (2004) (citing Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 
(1750) 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100). 
140 Take, for example, the UCC’s definition of unconscionability. It recognizes that 
whether unconscionability exists depends on the circumstances existing at the time of the 
contract. See U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2010) (“The basic test is whether, in the light of the 
general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, 
the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances 
existing at the time of the making of the contract.”); see also Sandra F. Gavin, 
Unconscionability Found: A Look at Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements 10 
Years after Doctor’s Associate’s, Inc. v. Casarotto, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 249, 264 (2006) 
(“[T]he unconscionability defense may be predicated upon a variety of factors and is a case 
sensitive analysis.”). 
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contract).141 This is known as procedural unconscionability.142 Second, the party 
challenging the agreement must demonstrate that the agreement’s terms are too 
unreasonable to warrant judicial enforcement.143 This is known as substantive 
unconscionability.144 Some courts require parties to satisfy both tests before 
invalidating an agreement.145 Others find that substantive unconscionability is 
enough.146 
As one might imagine, this fact-based inquiry makes it relatively easy for 
courts to invalidate arbitration agreements with little chance of being reversed on 
appeal.147 While they are not supposed to interpret arbitration agreements any 
differently than other contracts under state law,148 reviewing courts find it difficult 
to tell if lower courts did so.149 Thus, lower courts have been able to use the 
                                                 
141 See Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999) (recognizing 
that procedural unconscionability, or “unfair surprise,” occurs where an agreement is 
reached but the language is “convoluted or unclear” creating contractual terms not typically 
expected by the party who is asked to assent). 
142 See Stempel, supra note 139, at 794 (stating that procedural unconscionability 
“involves unfair contracting practices”). 
143 See Harris, 183 F.3d at 181 (recognizing that substantive unconscionability occurs 
where contractual terms are “unreasonably or grossly favorable to one side and to which 
the disfavored party does not assent”).  
144 See Stempel, supra note 139, at 794 (“Substantive unconscionability involved 
terms that—no matter how openly set forth or voluntarily accepted—are simply too unfair 
to merit judicial enforcement.”). Here are a few provisions that courts may find 
substantively unconscionable: limitations on damages; imposition of excessive fees; 
selection of an inconvenient forum; unreasonably short deadlines for filing claims, etc. Id. 
at 804–07. 
145 See, e.g., Harris, 183 F.3d at 181 (stating that “unconscionability” requires both 
procedural and substantive unconscionability); see also Ramona L. Lampley, Is Arbitration 
Under Attack?: Exploring the Recent Judicial Skepticism of the Class Arbitration Waiver 
and Innovative Solutions to the Unsettled Legal Landscape, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 477, 490 (2009) (“The arbitration clause contestant must prove that the clause was 
either procedurally unconscionable or substantively unconscionable, and in most states, 
both.”). 
146 See, e.g., Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1220 n.5 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The 
subscribers also argue on appeal that the class action waiver is procedurally 
unconscionable. We do not address this argument since we conclude infra that the clause is 
substantively unconscionable and thus unenforceable as a matter of law.”). 
147 See Bruhl, supra note 135, at 1422. 
148 See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) (“A court may not, then, in 
assessing the rights of litigants to enforce an arbitration agreement, construe that agreement 
in a manner different from that in which it otherwise construes nonarbitration agreements 
under state law.”). Otherwise courts could do what state legislatures could not after 
Doctor’s Associates. Id. (“Nor may a court rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to 
arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for 
this would enable the court to effect what we hold today the state legislature cannot.”). 
149 Bruhl, supra note 135, at 1422 (“This difficulty creates opportunities for lower 
courts to misapply, or perhaps even manipulate, state contract doctrines so as to nullify 
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unconscionability doctrine to avoid the Supreme Court’s arbitration mandate.150 In 
fact, it has been the main method for invalidating awards under Section 2 for 
“courts skeptical of the increasingly pervasive use of arbitration.”151 
But there was a lag between when the Supreme Court created the “national 
policy favoring arbitration” and when lower courts began employing 
unconscionability as a ground for invalidating awards. In the two years before 
Southland, for example, a study by Susan Randall found only fifty-four 
unconscionability cases, eight of which involved arbitration agreements.152 And 
only one of those eight unconscionability challenges succeeded.153 After 
Southland, this general trend continued as courts mostly followed the Supreme 
Court’s proarbitration rulings.154 But as the Court became more aggressively 
proarbitration—for example, when it eliminated state legislatures’ ability to 
regulate arbitration agreements in Doctor’s Associates—unconscionability 
challenges became much more common.155 Consider the following chart156 created 
by Aaron-Andrew Bruhl: 
 
                                                 
arbitration agreements while simultaneously frustrating the ability of reviewing courts to 
reverse.”). 
150 See Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability 
Doctrine: How the California Courts Are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3 
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 39, 40 (2006) (“Although ostensibly applying the ‘generally 
applicable’ contract defense of unconscionability, in cases involving the validity of 
arbitration agreements the California courts routinely apply an entirely different test, 
requiring less of parties seeking to avoid arbitration.”); Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial 
Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption, Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements 
to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469, 470–71 (stating that lower courts, through the 
unconscionability doctrine, have “gone too far” in failing to follow Supreme Court 
precedent); Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of 
Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 198 (2004) (“An examination of the application 
of unconscionability to similar issues in arbitration and nonarbitration contexts supports the 
conclusion that judges are avoiding arbitration through arbitration-specific expansions of 
the doctrine of unconscionability.”). 
151 Bruhl, supra note 135, at 1422. It is a form of strategic judging that allows the 
lower courts to “insulate their rulings from reversal by ideologically adverse reviewing 
courts.” Id. at 1425. 
152 Randall, supra note 150, at 196. 
153 Id. 
154 See Stempel, supra note 139, at 798. 
155 See id. at 761–62 (stating that the use of unconscionability “accelerated in the late 
1990s”). Because the Court had finally cut off state legislatures’ ability to regulate 
arbitration agreements, state courts tried to implement the legislatures’ policy wishes 
through judicial measures. See Bruhl, supra note 135, at 1434–35 (“State courts that resist 
the Supreme Court’s federal policy favoring arbitration are in many cases trying to 
effectuate not their own preferences but fundamental state legislative policies that restrict 
arbitration or apply heightened procedural safeguards.”). 
156 Bruhl, supra note 135, at 1440. 
2011] REGULATING MANDATORY ARBITRATION 1329 
 
 
Bruhl’s chart shows that unconscionability challenges began increasing 
around 1995 and that the upward trend more or less continued through 2007, when 
the challenges constituted approximately 19 percent of all arbitration cases.157 And 
while this shows only the increased use of the unconscionability defense, some 
evidence exists that the defense’s success rate also increased during this period. 
For example, Randall’s study showed that parties succeeded in approximately 50 
percent of their unconscionability challenges from 2002 to 2003, compared to a 
12.5 percent success rate from 1982 to 1983.158 So, in addition to unconscionability 
                                                 
157 Id. To see if parties are still using the unconscionability defense as frequently 
today, I ran a search using Bruhl’s parameters and found 76 cases involving 
unconscionability challenges between July 1, 2009 and July 1, 2010. As Bruhl noted in his 
article, this search method isn’t flawless, but at the very least it provides a general idea of 
the prevalence of the unconscionability doctrine today. 
158 Randall, supra note 150, at 194–96. In 1982–83, parties successfully used the 
unconscionability doctrine to invalidate arbitration agreements in 12.5 percent of the cases 
in Randall’s study. Id. at 196. And they succeeded at a rate of 15.2 percent in 
unconscionability challenges to other types of agreements. Id. By 2002–03, the numbers 
were 50.3 percent and 25.6 percent, respectively. Id. at 194. In other words, by 2002–03, 
courts appeared to be twice as willing to use the unconscionability doctrine in the context 
of arbitration, which is a pretty significant change from the parity that existed in 1982–83. 
See id. at 194–96; see also Broome, supra note 150, at 48 (studying California appellate 
court decisions and finding that “as a purely empirical matter, unconscionability challenges 
succeed with far greater frequency when the contractual provision at issue is an arbitration 
agreement”). While this increased success rate could be due to an increase in the 
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challenges becoming more prevalent, it appears that lower courts have become 
more receptive to those challenges as well.159 
This upswing in the unconscionability doctrine’s use and success occurred 
despite several movements at the end of the twentieth century that sought to limit 
judicial power, such as the rise of law and economics analysis, strong academic 
criticisms of the unconscionability doctrine generally, and a push for greater 
judicial restraint.160 It was the best remaining defense that lower courts had against 
the Supreme Court’s arbitration mandate, so they used it regardless of contrary 
intellectual and political trends.161 In response, the Supreme Court began shifting 
decision making authority away from courts and toward arbitrators, thus reducing 
lower courts’ ability to use the unconscionability doctrine to nullify unreasonable 
arbitration agreements.162 
In Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,163 for example, the Florida 
Supreme Court had refused to compel arbitration because it found the underlying 
contract “void for illegality.”164 The Supreme Court reversed, relying on 
                                                 
prevalence of unconscionable arbitration clauses, the sheer size of the increase, along with 
an examination of the case law, indicates that courts are subjecting arbitration agreements 
to increased scrutiny under the unconscionability doctrine. See Bruhl, supra note 135, at 
1441–42, 1455–64. 
159 On a related note, the overall hostility toward the Supreme Court’s arbitration 
mandate appears to be increasing. Take two anecdotal examples. First, twenty state 
attorneys general joined the respondents in Allied-Bruce in asking the Court to overturn 
Southland. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995). And, 
forty states, along with Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia, asked the Court to 
overturn Southland in Buckeye Check Cashing. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. 
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 441 (2006) (listing the attorneys general who submitted an Amici 
Curiae brief in support of respondents); Brief of Florida et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006) (No. 04-
1264), 2005 WL 2477361. Second, lower courts are vocalizing their displeasure with the 
Supreme Court’s proarbitration rulings. Two judges on the Minnesota Supreme Court, for 
example, refused to sign an order compelling arbitration after the Doctor’s Associates case 
was remanded to it by the Supreme Court. They said: “[w]e cannot in good conscience be 
an instrument of a policy which is as legally unfounded, socially detrimental, and 
philosophically misguided as the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in this and other cases 
which interpret and apply the Federal Arbitration Act.” Richard C. Reuben, Western 
Showdown: Two Montana Judges Buck the U.S. Supreme Court, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1996, at 
16; see also Randall, supra note 150, at 220–21 (referencing Montana Supreme Court’s 
refusal to sign an order pending arbitration). 
160 See Stempel, supra note 139, at 812–40. 
161 See id. 
162 Bruhl, supra note 135, at 1470–86. Part of what no doubt caught the Court’s 
attention was the increased number of certiorari petitions received in recent years that 
raised the unconscionability issue. Id. at 1466. 
163 546 U.S. 440 (2006). 
164 Id. at 442–43. The underlying contract was a “Deferred Deposit and Disclosure 
Agreement” that charged, according to the lower court, usurious interest rates. Id. 
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Southland165 and Prima Paint.166 Specifically, the Court said that Southland made 
the Federal Arbitration Act applicable in state courts and that Prima Paint required 
arbitrators, not courts, to decide challenges to the contract as a whole.167 The 
Florida Supreme Court thought it could avoid Prima Paint’s severability rule by 
finding the contract void ab initio168 rather than voidable, as in Prima Paint.169 The 
Supreme Court found this distinction irrelevant and ordered the parties to 
arbitrate.170 Overall, the case reminded lower courts of the Supreme Court’s ability 
to shift decision making authority to arbitrators and thereby reduce their roles in 
monitoring arbitration agreements.171 
In fact, Buckeye Check Cashing foreshadowed the Court’s most recent 
decision in Rent-a-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson.172 Rent-a-Center involved an 
arbitration agreement with a delegation clause that assigned disputes over the 
agreement’s enforceability to the arbitrator.173 Jackson challenged the agreement, 
claiming that some of its provisions (e.g., a provision requiring the parties to split 
arbitration fees) were unconscionable.174 By specifically challenging the arbitration 
provisions, it appeared that Jackson had complied with Prima Paint and Buckeye 
Check Cashing. But the Supreme Court disagreed, finding that Jackson’s challenge 
to the arbitration agreement must be decided by the arbitrator under the delegation 
clause.175 This appears to mean that any time an arbitration agreement has a 
delegation clause similar to Jackson’s, the only way to raise an unconscionability 
                                                 
165 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 17 (1984). 
166 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 406–07 (1967). 
Recall that the separability rule from Prima Paint requires (a) arbitrators to review 
challenges to an agreement as a whole and (b) courts to review challenges to the arbitration 
clause. Id. at 403–04. In other words, the separability rule is a rule for determining who 
decides. 
167 Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. at 445–46. 
168 Void ab initio means “[n]ull from the beginning, as from the first moment when a 
contract is entered into.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 5 (9th ed. 2009). 
169 Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. at 446 (“In declining to apply Prima Paint’s 
rule of severability, the Florida Supreme Court relied on the distinction between void and 
voidable contracts.”). 
170 Id. at 446, 449. 
171 See Bruhl, supra note 135, at 1474–75 (noting that the allocation rule “greatly 
facilitates federal monitoring of the enforcement of arbitration agreements.”). 
172 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010). 
173 Id. at 2775. Specifically, the delegation clause stated that the arbitrator “shall have 
exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, 
enforceability or formation of this Agreement including, but not limited to any claim that 
all or any part of this Agreement is void or voidable.” Id. 
174 Id. at 2775–76. 
175 Id. at 2779. To reach this conclusion, the Court had to use some pretty tortured 
logic. Namely, it said that the arbitration agreement in this case was the entire agreement 
and, therefore, that Jackson’s claim had to be arbitrated under Prima Paint. Id. at 2778–81. 
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challenge in court is to challenge the delegation clause itself.176 Only then will the 
court be able to hear unconscionability challenges to the arbitration agreement as a 
whole.177 Thus, inserting these delegation clauses in arbitration agreements will 
make it more difficult—if not impossible—for nondrafting parties to challenge the 
agreements’ substantive provisions in court. In effect, the court’s role may be 
limited “to little more than rubber-stamping motions to compel arbitration.”178 
 
B.  Reform Advocates Seek Congressional Relief 
 
Even before the Court’s recent Rent-a-Center decision, reform advocates had 
started seeking Congressional relief against companies that mandated arbitration. 
Using the unconscionability doctrine didn’t fully resolve the mandatory-arbitration 
problem—it worked only on a case-by-case basis.179 Plus, parties subjected to 
mandatory arbitration generally found the process fundamentally unfair. They 
believed they were being subjected to a biased process that limited their 
substantive and procedural rights,180 and they wanted Congress to preclude its use. 
Between 1995 and 2010, members of Congress introduced 139 bills that 
sought either to (a) eliminate mandatory arbitration for certain categories of 
disputes or (b) restrict the ways in which companies can use it. Nineteen ninety-
five was the year before Doctor’s Associates, and using it as a start date for 
surveying Congress’s activity provides helpful perspective for determining 
whether there is a congressional trend that mirrors the unconscionability trend in 
                                                 
176 Id. at 2781 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Even when a litigant has specifically 
challenged the validity of an agreement to arbitrate he must submit that challenge to the 
arbitrator unless he has lodged an objection to the particular line in the agreement that 
purports to assign such challenges to the arbitrator – the so-called ‘delegation clause.’”). 
177 Id. Put differently, parties may waive their right to challenge an arbitration clause 
in court, which is problematic because courts traditionally have protected individuals from 
substantively unfair arbitration clauses through the unconscionability doctrine. See David 
Horton, The Mandatory Core of Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 96 VA. L. REV. IN 
BRIEF 1, 5–6 (2010), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2010/04/02/horton.pdf. In 
fact, Section 4 says that courts “shall hear the parties” and that courts should compel 
arbitration only “upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration . . . is 
not in issue.” 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006). Also, Julius Cohen assured Congress at the 1924 Joint 
Hearings that the Act provided protections against forcing parties to arbitrate without some 
measure of judicial review. See 1924 Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 35 (brief submitted 
by Julius H. Cohen, General Counsel, New York State Chamber of Commerce) (stating 
that a party who in good faith refuses to arbitrate because she believes she is not bound by 
the agreement “is protected by the provision of the law which requires the court to examine 
into the merits of such a claim”). 
178 See Horton, supra note 177, at 2. 
179 See Bruhl, supra note 135, at 1441–43. 
180 See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS: 
ENFORCEABILITY AND OTHER TOPICS 4–9 (5th ed. 2007). 
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lower courts.181 Not surprisingly, there is. While individual parties were increasing 
their challenges to arbitration provisions in the courts,182 advocacy groups 
increasingly challenged them in Congress. Here’s a breakdown of the number of 




As the list in the Appendix183 explains, some of these bills were arbitration 
specific,184 and others suggested changes to arbitration laws as a small part of a 
larger act.185 In either case, most bills died in committee; many were reintroduced 
in following years only to meet the same fate; and the few that ultimately passed 
applied only to relatively narrow categories of disputes.  
In fact, of the 139 Congressional antiarbitration bills, only five passed both 
houses and became law during this period. The first was the Motor Vehicle 
                                                 
181 What I mean, specifically, is that I wanted to see if members of Congress began 
introducing more anti-arbitration bills post-Doctor’s Associates, just as the use of the 
unconscionability doctrine increased in lower courts post-Doctor’s Associates. See Bruhl, 
supra note 135, at 1440. 
182 See id. 
183 See infra Part VI. 
184 See, e.g., A Bill to Amend Title 9, United States Code, to Allow Employees the 
Right to Accept or Reject the Use of Arbitration to Resolve an Employment Controversy, 
H.R. 613, 106th Cong. (1999) (allowing arbitration only where one party requests it and the 
other party consents in writing within 60 days). 
185 See, e.g., Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2000, H.R. 3901, 106th Cong. (2000) 
(including a provision that high-cost mortgages may not include a mandatory arbitration 
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Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act, which failed in the 105th and 106th 
Congresses before finally passing in the 107th.186 It was limited to prohibiting 
motor vehicle manufacturers, importers, and distributors from mandating 
arbitration under their franchise agreements.187 The second was the John Warner 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, which passed the 109th 
Congress.188 It contained a provision exempting military personnel and their 
dependents from having to arbitrate consumer-credit disputes.189 The third was the 
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, which contained a provision 
allowing parties to opt out of arbitration under livestock and poultry contracts.190  
Senators Feingold and Grassley introduced bills with comparable provisions 
in three prior Congresses before finally passing this one in the 110th.191 The fourth 
was the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2010, which contained a 
provision prohibiting the government from contracting with employers that require 
arbitration of “any claim under [T]itle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or any 
tort related to or arising out of sexual assault or harassment, including assault and 
battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, or 
negligent hiring, supervision, or retention.”192 Popularly known as the Franken 
Anti-Rape Amendment, this provision passed the 111th Congress after the uproar 
over the dispute between Jamie Leigh Jones and KBR.193 Finally, the 111th 
                                                 
186 See Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act of 2001, S. 1140, 
107th Cong. (2001); Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act of 2001, 
H.R. 1296, 107th Cong. (2001); Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act 
of 2000, H.R. 534, 106th Cong. (2000); Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 1999, S. 1020, 106th Cong. (1999); Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract 
Arbitration Fairness Act of 1998, S. 2434, 105th Cong. (1998). 
187 Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act of 2001, S. 1140, 107th 
Cong. (2001). The bill defined motor vehicle franchise contracts as contracts “under which 
a motor vehicle manufacturer, importer, or distributor sells motor vehicles to any other 
person for resale to an ultimate purchaser and authorizes such other person to repair and 
service the manufacturer’s motor vehicles.” Id. § 2. The bill said that if a motor vehicle 
franchise contract called for arbitration of disputes, then the parties to the contract would 
be able to opt out of that provision after any dispute arose. Id. If the parties chose to 
proceed with arbitration, then the bill required the arbitrator to provide a written 
explanation of the basis for the award. Id. 
188 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, H.R. 5122, 
109th Cong. (2006). 
189 See id. § 670. 
190 Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, H.R. 2419, 110th Cong. § 210 
(2008). 
191 See Fair Contracts for Growers Act of 2005, S. 2131, 109th Cong. (2005); Fair 
Contracts for Growers Act of 2003, S. 91, 108th Cong. (2003); Fair Contracts for Growers 
Act of 2002, S. 2943, 107th Cong. (2002). 
192 Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2010, H.R. 3326, 111th Cong. § 
8116(a)(1) (2009). 
193 See Amanda Terkel, Obama Signs Franken’s Anti-rape Amendment into Law, 
THINK PROGRESS (Dec. 21, 2009, 1:50 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/2009 /12/21/obama-
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Congress also passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act.194 Among other things, this Act gave the SEC authority to restrict 
or prohibit mandatory arbitration under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.195 It also created a Consumer Protection 
Financial Bureau that will have the same power over arbitration provisions in 
“consumer financial products and services” agreements.196 It is the only bill of the 
five that even considered regulation as a means for dealing with mandatory 
arbitration.197 
In fact, the overwhelming majority of the 139 bills introduced since 1995 
proposed eliminating, rather than regulating, mandatory arbitration. And the bills 
that proposed regulating mandatory arbitration generally received little, if any, 
widespread support. Consider, for example, two bills Senator Sessions introduced 
in the 106th, 107th, and 110th Congresses, respectively: the Consumer and 
Employee Arbitration Bill of Rights; the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2002; and the 
Fair Arbitration Act of 2007.198 Each applied to “consumer” and “employment” 
agreements, which were broadly defined.199 Also, each bill’s substance was the 
same—they all sought to regulate the circumstances under which parties could 
mandate arbitration.200 In other words, they did not seek to eliminate mandatory 
                                                 
franken/ (noting that many republicans faced “intense political blowback” because of their 
opposition to the legislation and referring to it as an “unnecessary attack on their allies in 
the private contracting business”). 
194 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 
111th Cong. (2010).  
195 Id. § 921. It also exempted certain Truth in Lending Act claims and certain 
whistleblower retaliation claims from mandatory arbitration. Id. §§ 748, 922, 1057. 
196 See id. § 1028. The new Bureau will be part of the Federal Reserve, but the 
Reserve will have little oversight over it. Basically, the Reserve will simply fund its 
operations. See id. § 1012. 
197 See id. § 1028. 
198 Fair Arbitration Act of 2007, S. 1135, 110th Cong. (2007); Arbitration Fairness 
Act of 2002, S. 3026, 107th Cong. (2002); Consumer and Employee Arbitration Bill of 
Rights, S. 3210, 106th Cong. (2000). 
199 “Consumer” agreements included “the sale or rental of goods, services, or real 
property, including an extension of credit or the provision of any other financial product or 
service, to an individual in a transaction entered into primarily for personal, family, or 
household purposes.” See, e.g., S. 3210 § 2(a). “Employment” agreements meant “a 
uniform, employer promulgated plan that covers all employees in a company, facility, or 
work grade, and that may cover legally protected rights or statutory rights” and did “not 
include any individually negotiated executive employment agreements.” Id. 
200 Each bill would have required arbitration clauses: (1) to have their headings in 
bold, capital letters; (2) to state whether arbitration is mandatory or optional; (3) to provide 
contact information for a source where contracting parties can get more information on the 
arbitration process; and (4) to allow parties to have the option of resolving disputes under 
$50,000 in small claims court. The bills also would have entitled parties: (1) to competent 
and neutral arbitrators; (2) to representation and a fair hearing; (3) to present evidence, 
cross-examine witnesses, and have a record of the proceedings; and (4) to timely resolution 
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arbitration, as most other bills during this period did. Instead, they sought to 
control how it could be carried out.201 None of Sessions’s bills had cosponsors, and 
all three died without hearings in the Senate Judiciary Committee.202 
In contrast, the Arbitration Fairness Acts of 2007 and 2009 were two of the 
more widely publicized reform bills introduced during this period. The 2007 Act 
applied to employment, consumer, and franchise disputes, as well as disputes 
under statutes intended to (1) protect civil rights or (2) regulate contracts between 
parties with unequal bargaining power.203 The 2009 Act covers the same disputes, 
except that it does not include the unequal bargaining power provision.204 Both 
Acts would eliminate, rather than regulate, mandatory arbitration for the covered 
disputes.205 Although both ultimately died in committee, they have received far 
greater attention and support in Congress than Sessions’s bills did.206 For example, 
the 2007 Act had a total of 110 cosponsors in both houses and the 2009 Act had 
127.207 Also, unlike any of Sessions’s bills, subcommittees of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee and the House Judiciary Committee held hearings on the 2007 Act.208 
                                                 
and a written award. See S. 1135 § 2; S. 3026 § 2; S. 3210 § 2. These bills were unique in 
that they did not try to eliminate mandatory arbitration outright. 
201 S. 3026 § 2; S. 3210 § 2. 
202 S. 3026; S. 3210. To clarify Sessions’s role in mandatory-arbitration reform, I do 
not believe he falls within my definition of “reform groups” or “reform advocates.” As one 
anecdotal, but telling, example, he opposed the Franken Amendment to the Department of 
Defense Appropriations Act of 2010, saying that it “would impose the will of Congress on 
private individuals and companies in a retroactive fashion, invalidating employment 
contracts without due process of law.” See Ryan Grim, Defense Department Opposed 
Franken’s Anti-Rape Amendment, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 19, 2009, 7:14 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/10/19/defense-department-oppose_n_326569.html 
(last visited on Nov. 7, 2011). 
203 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007); Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007). 
204 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009); Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 4 (2009). 
205 See S. 931 § 3; H.R. 1020 § 4; S. 1782 § 4. And both would have a court, rather 
than an arbitrator, decide initial challenges to an arbitration agreement, thus eliminating 
Prima Paint’s severability rule. Id.; S. 1782 § 4. 
206 The Arbitration Fairness Acts have also received greater academic attention. See, 
e.g., Bradley Dillon-Coffman, Revising the Revision: Procedural Alternatives to the 
Arbitration Fairness Act, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1095 (2010); Joshua T. Mandelbaum, Stuck in 
a Bind: Can the Arbitration Fairness Act Solve the Problems of Mandatory Binding 
Arbitration in the Consumer Context?, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1075 (2010); Peter B. Rutledge, 
Who Can Be Against Fairness? The Case Against the Arbitration Fairness Act, 9 
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT. RESOL. 267 (2008). 
207 Bill Summary & Status, 111th Congress (2009–2010) S. 93, LIBR. CONGRESS, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:s931: (last visited Nov. 13, 2011); Bill 
Summary & Status, 111th Congress (2009–2010) H.R. 1020, LIBR. CONGRESS, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:h1020: (last visited Nov. 13, 2011); Bill 
Summary & Status, 110th Congress (2007–2008) S. 1792, LIBR. CONGRESS, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:s1782: (last visited Nov. 13, 2011); Bill 
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In short, it appears that reform groups have been pushing Congress to 
eliminate, rather than to regulate, mandatory arbitration—a short-sighted approach 
that disregards mandatory arbitration’s public benefits (e.g., reducing judicial 
caseloads and lowering companies’ dispute-resolution costs) and makes arbitration 
itself seem like the problem. The problem is not arbitration itself; rather, the 
problem is that companies have abused mandatory arbitration because the Supreme 
Court has allowed them to do so. The solution, then, is not to eliminate mandatory 
arbitration but to keep it in place (at least for now) and to regulate it to prevent its 
past abuses from continuing. This pragmatic approach gives companies a cheaper, 
alternative method for resolving disputes while also protecting individual rights 
previously lost in mandatory arbitration. 
 
IV.  EMBRACING REGULATION IN MANDATORY ARBITRATION 
 
So far I’ve addressed the Supreme Court’s success with arbitration formalism 
and the mixed accomplishments of the reform advocates’ liberal response. In other 
words, I’ve addressed whether these two movements have, in fact, worked. 
Separate from the question of whether the movements have worked is the question 
of whether they should work. This Part demonstrates that both movements are 
flawed and that adopting a goal-oriented pragmatic approach, one that regulates 
mandatory arbitration’s use to improve its overall fairness, makes more sense. 
 
A.  The Problems with Supreme Court Formalism 
 
Defining formalism is complicated because numerous conflicting versions 
exist.209 One common definition, however, explains formalism as “the use of 
deductive logic to derive the outcome of a case from premises accepted as 
authoritative.”210 And because formalism restricts or eliminates courts’ discretion 
to make exceptions to a given rule, it is sometimes referred to as “mechanical 
                                                 
Summary & Status, 110th Congress (2007–2008) H.R. 3010, LIBR. CONGRESS, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:h3010: (last visited Nov. 13, 2011). 
208 See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007: Hearing on S. 1782 Before the Subcomm. on 
the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007); Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 3010 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and 
Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007). 
209 See Curtis Bridgeman, Why Contracts Scholars Should Read Legal Philosophy: 
Positivism, Formalism, and the Specification of Rules in Contract Law, 29 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1443, 1449–50 (2008); Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 
607, 609 n.6 (1999). 
210 Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of 
Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 181 (1987); see also Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Formalism and Functionalism in Federalism Analysis, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
959, 959 (1997) (“The decisions were formalistic in that they reasoned deductively from 
minimally justified premises and expressly eschewed consideration of what result would be 
best from a policy perspective.”). 
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jurisprudence.”211 Courts simply look at the rule, decide what conclusion would 
further that rule given the facts, and then reach that conclusion without considering 
policies that might justify a different outcome.212 
The Supreme Court’s arbitration decisions fall within this general description 
of formalism.213 The Court uses the “national policy favoring arbitration” and 
“party autonomy” as its major premises for deriving case outcomes. Given these 
premises’ nature, and given the Court’s general refusal to consider policy concerns 
regarding arbitration’s potential for abuse,214 the outcome of any given case seems 
pre-ordained. In fact, over the last twenty-five years, the Court has mechanically 
relied on the “national policy” and “party autonomy” to expand the Federal 
Arbitration Act’s scope beyond Congress’s original intent.215 Consequently, 
                                                 
211 See Bridgeman, supra note 209, at 1449 (“The traditional definition offered is the 
familiar caricature of classical formalism as ‘mechanical jurisprudence.’”); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 638–39 
(1999) (stating that formalism is an attempt to make the law deductive “in the sense that 
judges decide cases mechanically on the basis of preexisting law and do not exercise 
discretion in individual cases”). 
212 See Sunstein, supra note 211, at 638–39. 
213 MACNEIL, supra note 16, at viii (describing the reasoning in the Court’s arbitration 
decisions over the last twenty-five years as “bureaucratic formalism”). The Court 
sometimes claims to base its decisions in textualist terms. See, e.g., 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. 
Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1472 (2009) (“We cannot rely on this judicial policy concern as a 
source of authority for introducing a qualification into the ADEA that is not found in its 
text.”); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (“As the conclusion 
we reach today is directed by the text of § 1, we need not assess the legislative history of 
the exclusion provision.”). But this is really a form of “no-text textualism.” Margaret L. 
Moses, The Pretext of Textualism: Disregarding Stare Decisis in 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 14 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 825, 826 (2010) (explaining that the Court uses “no-text 
textualism” to “reinvent statutes, abandon precedent, and create its own norms in the field 
of arbitration”). Thus, I believe formalism is a better descriptive term than textualism for 
the Court’s decision making in the arbitration context. See MACNEIL, supra note 16, at viii; 
see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Arbitral 
Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1381, 1418, 1428 (1996) 
(explaining how the Court uses “wooden formalism” to reach its arbitration decisions). 
214 For example, the Court has disregarded legitimate concerns regarding parties’ lack 
of consent and arbitration’s unsuitability for certain disputes. See, e.g., Shearson/Am. 
Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 229–31 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626–28 (1984). 
215 See, e.g., Rent-a-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010) (stating 
that the Act “reflects the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract,” and 
enforcing a contractual provision that made the parties submit arbitrability issues to the 
arbitrator); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991) (compelling 
arbitration of a statutory claim and stating that sections 2, 3, and 4 of the Act reflect the 
“liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements”). 
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mandatory arbitration has increased significantly.216 But the Court has shown little 
concern; its goal, after all, has been to reduce judicial caseloads, and using these 
premises allows it to achieve that goal.217 
The Court’s arbitration formalism is subject to at least three criticisms: 
rigidity; overdependence on deductive reasoning; and reliance on false premises. 
First, formalism is too rigid. The Court treats the “national policy” and “party 
autonomy” as immutable rules that demand arbitration’s expansion. It refuses to 
make policy-based exceptions to those rules.218 And it has shown little willingness 
to reshape those rules as parties’ use of arbitration has changed over time.219 For 
example, as businesses increasingly required arbitration in response to the Court’s 
proarbitration decisions, they simultaneously began limiting nondrafting parties’ 
procedural rights during those arbitrations.220 The Court has done little to correct 
this behavior, relying on formal logic instead of experience to continue expanding 
the Act.221 This failure to respond is why consumers, employees, and franchisees 
increasingly have asked Congress for relief, and it is why their requests have 
become more successful.222 
The second criticism of the Court’s arbitration formalism is that it emphasizes 
the deductive process over the choice of premises.223 Put differently, the Court 
                                                 
216 See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 1631, 1632–33 (2005) (explaining how the “federal policy” spawned an increase in 
mandatory arbitration). 
217 See MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 172 (“One cannot immerse oneself in the 
arbitration cases without coming to the conclusion that a major force driving the Court is 
docket-clearing pure and simple. That is, the Court is motivated to reduce the cases having 
to be tried by the judicial system, particularly the federal judicial system.”). 
218 See, e.g., McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226; Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 626. 
219 This is a central problem with formalism. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 41 (1990) (explaining that “[f]ormalism contains a built-in 
bias against legal change”). 
220 For example, some mandatory arbitration agreements contain provisions that 
severely limit discovery, eliminate the right to class actions, forbid cross-examination of 
witnesses, and impose biased arbitrators. See Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Contracting with 
Tortfeasors: Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and Personal Injury Claims, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 262–63 (2004). 
221 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (49th prtg. 1949) (“The life 
of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”). This is problematic given that 
many of these changes resulted from the Court’s own decisions. This is what I mean by 
saying that the Court’s stance is too rigid. See generally Steven M. Quevedo, Formalist 
and Instrumentalist Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 119, 121–22 
(1985) (stating that a formalist court will rely “on existing legal rules and logical deduction 
to decide any and all cases presented to it,” and that, as a result, legal rules become “rigidly 
unchangeable”). 
222 For example, the recently passed Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act gives the proposed agency the power to either eliminate or regulate 
mandatory arbitration in certain categories of disputes. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 1028(b) (2010). 
223 See POSNER, supra note 219, at 38–42. 
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gives the impression that its premises (“party autonomy” and the “national policy”) 
are self-evident and then deduces an outcome that is inevitable given the premises 
used.224 This makes it appear that the Court’s decision making abilities are 
limited—that it has no other choice but to rule a certain way.225 Correctly choosing 
premises is more difficult than correctly deriving an outcome from given 
premises.226 So instead of focusing on the premises’ validity, the Court simply 
selects premises and then focuses on deriving an outcome, which allows it to deny 
that it is making any political or moral judgments.227 The problem is that these 
denials are false.228 The Court makes political judgments when choosing premises 
for its arbitration decisions. Specifically, it wants to reduce judicial caseloads.229 
Choosing “party autonomy” and the “national policy favoring arbitration” as its 
premises furthers that end. 
Finally, the Court’s two premises are false.230 Congress did not create a 
“national policy favoring arbitration” when it passed the Federal Arbitration Act.231 
It simply created a procedural law that directed federal courts to enforce 
merchants’ arbitration agreements.232 In fact, the Act’s legislative history makes 
plain Congress’s intent,233 which likely explains why the Court failed to cite any 
                                                 
224 See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25, 33 (1991); 
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7, 10 (1984); see also Posner, supra note 210, at 
182 (stating that formalists want “to give the impression that the premises [are] self-
evident—meanwhile packing as much into the major premises as possible, to shorten the 
chain of deductions.”). The Court’s basic logic looks something like this: Congress created 
a “national policy favoring arbitration” when it passed the Federal Arbitration Act. And 
arbitration is a matter of contract, i.e., party autonomy. Accordingly, it makes logical sense 
to broadly interpret the Act and vigorously enforce parties’ arbitration agreements. 
225 See ROY L. BROOKS, STRUCTURES OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING FROM LEGAL 
FORMALISM TO CRITICAL THEORY 32, 57 (2d ed. 2005) (“In treating judicial decision 
making like mathematics, legal formalism creates the appearance that it is an apolitical 
process.”). 
226 See Posner, supra note 210, at 181–82. 
227 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 24 (1996) 
(“There is a pervasive impulse to formalism within the legal culture, though the impulse 
moves to the fore in particular periods, when judges find it especially necessary to say that 
their judgments about ‘what the law is’ do not rest on political and moral claims.”). 
228 Id. (“The vice of formalism is found whenever people in law falsely deny that they 
are making political and moral judgments.”). 
229 See MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 172; Moses, supra note 20, at 156. 
230 This is problematic because the truth of an outcome depends on the truth of its 
premises. See POSNER, supra note 219, at 38. 
231 Moses, supra note 20, at 123 (“The 1925 Congress never indicated in the slightest 
way that arbitration was to be favored over judicial resolution of disputes. It simply made 
arbitration of commercial and maritime agreements enforceable in federal court because, 
until 1925, such agreements had essentially been revocable at will by the parties.”). 
232 See supra Part I. 
233 See supra Part I; see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 25 (1984) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“One rarely finds a legislative history as unambiguous as the 
FAA’s. That history establishes conclusively that the 1925 Congress viewed the FAA as a 
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authority when announcing the “national policy” in Southland.234 Also, the Court 
gives too much credence to “party autonomy.” Saying that parties should be free to 
negotiate the manner in which they resolve their disputes oversimplifies the 
issue.235 Certain parties have little or no bargaining power, which means they have 
no true choice in deciding whether to arbitrate.236 Thus, while arbitration may be a 
“matter of contract,” certain contracts deserve greater scrutiny than others. Yet the 
Court treats all arbitration agreements alike, citing “party autonomy” regardless of 
the circumstances under which an agreement was signed.237 
Together, these three criticisms illustrate the flaws in the Court’s arbitration 
formalism and help explain why parties subjected to mandatory arbitration have 
been advocating for reform. But whether these criticisms justify eliminating 
mandatory arbitration—which is the most common reform being requested238—is 
questionable because eliminating mandatory arbitration has its problems, too. 
 
B.  The Limitations of the Reform Advocates’ Liberal Response 
 
Liberalism, like formalism, is hard to define. For starters, political liberalism 
differs from legal liberalism. Oversimplified, the former involves a conception of 
rights and public goods and a debate over how to take public goods into account, if 
at all, when deciding how to enforce rights.239 Also oversimplified, the latter 
distrusts large organizations and views the law’s fundamental concern as attending 
                                                 
procedural statute, applicable only in federal courts, derived, Congress believed, largely 
from the federal power to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts.”). 
234 See Southland, 465 U.S. at 10; Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hospital v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
235 See Sternlight, supra note 59, at 688–93. 
236 EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL 
ASSESSMENT 7 (2006) (“A consumer who is forced to arbitrate a dispute without having 
knowledgably consented to arbitration loses both the freedom to use the court system and 
the freedom to contract in a knowing fashion.”). 
237 See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under 
the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 962–69 (1999) (“The problem with 
understanding the FAA cases as primarily about enforcing private agreements to arbitrate is 
that, in many recent cases, courts have applied attenuated notions of consent, compelling 
arbitration when consent is thin, if not outright fictitious.”). Paternalism is one common 
argument against the unconscionability doctrine. But it is not paternalistic because courts 
have an interest in refusing to put their stamp of approval on agreements that are “harmful, 
exploitative, or immoral.” Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability 
Doctrine, and Accommodation, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 224 (2000). 
238 See supra Part III. 
239 See generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 184–
95 (2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter SANDEL, LIBERALISM] (describing political liberalism). 
Generally, liberalism insists on fair procedures and respect for individual rights. MICHAEL 
J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT 7–8 (1996). 
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the needs of the vulnerable.240 For the purposes of this Article, I use “liberalism” to 
mean reform advocates’ attempts to protect consumers, employees, franchisees, 
and others from large (or more powerful) organizations by eliminating mandatory 
arbitration—a form of legal liberalism. But because political liberalism and legal 
liberalism often overlap, I address their actions from a political-liberalism 
perspective as well, principally because the reform advocates want to protect 
individual rights without accounting for any public good that mandatory arbitration 
may create.241 In doing so, I show that the reform advocates’ attempts to eliminate 
mandatory arbitration are premature. Regulating, rather than eliminating, 
mandatory arbitration as an alternative method for resolving disputes is the best 
course of action—at least for now. 
Most of the reform advocates’ criticisms of mandatory arbitration focus on 
how it affects individual rights, including the right to a fair hearing, the right to a 
transparent decision-making process, and the right to make autonomous 
decisions.242 They believe arbitration should be governed by principles that 
promote these rights and that these rights cannot be sacrificed for the public 
good.243 In other words, they believe these rights trump considerations of what 
might be best for the public at large.244 However, the reform advocates’ criticisms 
ignore mandatory arbitration’s larger effect on society—specifically, its potential 
effect on the public good.245 Although this is a common criticism of liberalism 
                                                 
240 William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist 
Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 135 (2004). Professor Simon 
explains that legal liberalism is based on three background premises (the victim 
perspective, populism, and the priority of rights) and three strategic premises (a preference 
for controlling information, choosing between rules and standards, and structuring 
procedure). Id. at 133. 
241 Legal liberalism and political liberalism have been linked since the Warren Court. 
See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 2 (1996). 
242 See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong., § 2 (2009) 
(listing the bill’s Congressional “findings”). 
243 See generally STEPHEN MULHALL & ADAM SWIFT, LIBERALS & COMMUNITARIANS 
42 (1992) (stating that liberalism asserts that “the rights of individual citizens cannot be 
sacrificed for the sake of other goods or goals”); SANDEL, LIBERALISM, supra note, 239, at 
185 (explaining that, according to political liberalism, “individual rights . . . outweigh . . . 
consideration of the common good”). 
244 See id. 
245 The reform advocates do, sometimes, reference negative effects that mandatory 
arbitration has on the public. For example, the Congressional “findings” in the Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 2009 state that mandatory arbitration “undermines the development of 
public law for civil rights and consumer rights.” See H.R. 1020 § 2. But they neglect any 
positive contributions that mandatory arbitration has made. To be clear, I’m not saying that 
mandatory arbitration is a public good or that its benefits outweigh its costs. I honestly 
don’t know for certain whether such statements are true. And I’m not sure that anyone else 
does either. Also, I’m not advocating that the question can be fully answered by a cost-
benefit analysis. All I’m saying is that we somehow need to take mandatory arbitration’s 
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generally,246 and although this general criticism can be rebutted,247 it has particular 
merit in the mandatory-arbitration context for three reasons. 
First, mandatory arbitration is a relatively new phenomenon. It emerged only 
over the last twenty-five years, which means that courts and policy makers have 
not had a great deal of time to study its use.248 In fact, empirical data related to its 
use is limited, so the question of whether mandatory arbitration is a public good is 
difficult to answer.249 Accordingly, we should continue to study its use to 
determine its overall effect on society (while taking steps to improve its fairness). 
But the reform advocates prefer to ignore mandatory arbitration’s potential benefits 
and focus instead on recognizing consumers’, employees’, and franchisees’ 
“rights.”250 In particular, they disregard mandatory arbitration’s tendency to reduce 
judicial caseloads and lower companies’ dispute-resolution costs, while 
concentrating on their right to a fair hearing and their right to make autonomous 
decisions.251 Ignoring these factors is a short-sighted approach. Mandatory 
arbitration is too new, and the laws surrounding it have changed too fast, to say 
with absolute certainty that it should be eliminated at this point.252 
This leads to the second criticism of the reform advocates’ liberal position. 
Reform advocates would likely respond that their rights should be considered prior 
to and separate from the public good, and that their rights should therefore 
                                                 
effect on the public good into account. I believe adopting a more pragmatic approach to 
mandatory arbitration can help achieve this goal. 
246 See STEPHEN HOLMES, THE ANATOMY OF ANTILIBERALISM, at xii–xiii, 6 (1993). 
247 See id. at 198–200. 
248 Sternlight, supra note 216, at 1631–32 (“The involuntary imposition of arbitration 
in lieu of open court procedures is a new and most controversial phenomenon.”). 
249 Id. at 1634 (“Although the question of whether mandatory arbitration positively or 
negatively impacts most individuals has been widely debated among academics and 
practitioners, empirical data is scant and not likely to resolve this question in the near 
future.”). For competing empirical studies, compare O’DONNELL, supra note 11, with 
Sarah R. Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, Empirical Research on Consumer Arbitration: What 
the Data Reveals, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1051 (2009). 
250 Simon, supra note 240, at 148 (stating that legal liberalism has “a Utopian 
tendency to ignore the costs of the recognition of entitlements”). 
251 Take, for example, the Congressional “findings” in the Arbitration Fairness Acts 
of 2007 and 2009. Neither set of findings mentions mandatory arbitration’s tendency to 
reduce judicial caseloads and lower companies’ dispute resolution costs. Instead, both 
focus on mandatory arbitration’s negative effects. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, 
H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. 
(2007). 
252 To be clear, I agree that the current mandatory-arbitration framework is not 
entirely fair and that it needs to be changed. All I’m saying here is that it’s too soon to 
eliminate mandatory arbitration because we don’t yet know enough about it. See Simon, 
supra note 240, at 177–78 (“The Pragmatist objects to the liberal idea of rights 
enforcement as the elaboration of a pre-existing moral consensus. She sides with the Legal 
Realist in insisting that whatever normative consensus exists in the society is too 
incomplete and ambiguous to play the role Legal Liberalism expects.”). 
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prevail.253 But the validity of their rights-oriented claims is sometimes debatable. 
For instance, Stephen Ware argues that mandatory arbitration does not interfere 
with autonomy.254 Specifically, he disputes the reform advocates’ claim that 
individuals should not be forced to arbitrate unless they “knowingly” consented to 
an arbitration agreement, stating that arbitration law does not apply “subjective 
knowing-consent standards.”255 Also, Bo Rutledge disputes all of the congressional 
“findings” that appear in the Arbitration Fairness Acts of 2007 and 2009.256 He 
says the findings—which lay out the individual rights that are lost through 
mandatory arbitration—are based on underdeveloped normative and empirical 
claims and that arbitration has improved the average individual’s access to 
justice.257 Rutledge’s and Ware’s opinions on these topics are well-stated, and they 
are not espousing fringe views. In other words, at least some of the reform 
advocates “rights” are debatable, which reduces the validity of their rights-
oriented, liberal position. 
Finally, the reform advocates assert that the judiciary is more capable of 
protecting individual rights—even though the judiciary isn’t perfect in this 
regard258—and most fail to consider whether regulating arbitration could make it a 
more rights-oriented process.259 In fact, the majority of bills submitted to Congress 
over the last fifteen years called for eliminating mandatory arbitration, thereby 
implicitly assuming that the court system will protect individual rights lost in 
arbitration.260 Also, the few bills that did suggest regulating mandatory 
arbitration—thus attempting to improve its fairness for individuals subjected to 
it—received little congressional support.261 In other words, the reform advocates 
                                                 
253 See SANDEL, LIBERALISM, supra note, 239, at 185. 
254 BRUNET ET AL., supra note 236, at 335 (“[T]he value of autonomy requires that 
people be bound by agreements they formed even when they did not know or understand, 
in any meaningful way, what they were agreeing to.”). 
255 Id. at 334–35; see also Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional 
Consumer Law (With a Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. 
REV. 195, 201 (1998) (“There is no duress in the typical ‘adhesion’ contract. A consumer 
who contracts in such circumstances does so voluntarily.”). 
256 Rutledge, supra note 206, at 268–79. 
257 Id. at 277 (“In sum, the findings that underpin the most radical overhaul of federal 
arbitration law in over eighty years are scientifically unproven, normatively debatable or 
demonstrably wrong.”). 
258 Simon, supra note 240, at 180 (“The American judiciary appears to be doing a 
very poor job of enforcing a broad range of rights.”). 
259 Very few bills actually suggested changes to current arbitration laws to make the 
process fairer for individuals subjected to mandatory arbitration. See, e.g., Fair Arbitration 
Act of 2007, S. 1135, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2002, S. 3026, 
107th Cong. § 2 (2002); Consumer and Employee Arbitration Bill of Rights, S. 3210, 
106th Cong. § 2 (2000). 
260 See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931 111th Cong. § 2 (2009); 
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020 111th Cong. § 2 (2009). 
261 For example, the three bills introduced by Senator Jeff Sessions, which proposed 
certain regulations for the mandatory-arbitration process, had no co-sponsors. Bill 
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have been fixated on eliminating, rather than regulating, mandatory arbitration, 
even if it means being subjected to a court system that has its own issues with 
protecting individual rights. 
In sum, the reform advocates’ liberal position is too rigid. They want to 
eliminate a relatively new process without fully studying its effects; they describe 
debatable rights as being absolute; and they refuse to concede that arbitration can 
be, with some changes, a more rights-oriented process. Instead of this rigid 
position, reform advocates should adopt a more pragmatic approach to mandatory 
arbitration, one that focuses on regulating, rather than eliminating, the process. 
Regulating mandatory arbitration would increase fairness for the parties subjected 
to it while allowing everyone to study it over time to determine its overall effect on 
the public good. 
 
C.  Proposing a Goal-Oriented, Pragmatic Approach 
 
So far I’ve examined the problems with the Supreme Court’s arbitration 
formalism, including the resulting increase in mandatory arbitration, and the limits 
of the reform advocates’ liberal response, including its rigidity. Now I want to 
propose an alternative approach for dealing with mandatory arbitration, one that 
continues its use while improving its overall fairness through legislative or agency 
regulation. In doing so, I hope to show that regulating mandatory arbitration is 
consistent with pragmatic principles and that a goal-oriented version of 
pragmatism is superior to formalism and liberalism in this context.  
The goal-oriented version of pragmatism I propose considers consequences; it 
is anti-dogmatic; it acknowledges that other perspectives exist; and it values 
experimentation.262 In that sense, it is consistent with the everyday use of the word 
“pragmatic”263 because it focuses on figuring out what works and finding solutions 
                                                 
Summary & Status, 110th Congress (2007–2008) S. 1135, LIBR. CONGRESS, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:s1135: (last visited Nov. 13, 2011); Bill 
Summary & Status, 107th Congress (2001–2002) S. 3026, LIBR. 
CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:s3026: (last visited Nov. 13, 
2011); Bill Summary & Status, 106th Congress (1999–2000) S. 3210, LIBR. CONGRESS, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d106:s3210: (last visited Nov. 13, 2011). 
262 See Sullivan & Solove, supra note 13, at 706, 734, 738. The description that I give 
here of pragmatism is pieced together from several sources. These sources show there are 
three basic types: philosophical, legal, and everyday. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, 
PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 49–56 (2003) (explaining everyday pragmatism); Thomas 
C. Grey, Freestanding Legal Pragmatism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 21, 21 (1996) (discussing 
legal pragmatism and philosophical pragmatism and stating that the former should stand 
free from the latter). I borrow mostly from descriptions of legal pragmatism and everyday 
pragmatism, and the goal-oriented pragmatism I propose is similar to the “radical 
pragmatism” described by Sullivan & Solove, supra note 13, at 691–92. 
263 See POSNER, supra note 262, at 49–50 (describing everyday pragmatism as “the 
mindset denoted by the popular usage of the word ‘pragmatic’”); see also RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 227 (1999) [hereinafter 
POSNER, MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY] (“I am interested in pragmatism as a disposition to 
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to problems.264 It also rejects the formalist idea that law is grounded in permanent, 
immutable principles and the liberal idea that rights enforcement is the elaboration 
of a moral consensus.265  
For example, both the Supreme Court’s arbitration formalism and the reform 
advocates’ arbitration liberalism are too absolute. The former mechanically 
enforces arbitration agreements based on flawed deductive reasoning, allowing 
companies to mandate arbitration with individuals on terms that aren’t always 
fair.266 The latter characterizes sometimes-debatable rights as indisputable and 
demands mandatory arbitration’s elimination, disregarding any public benefits that 
mandatory arbitration may have.267  
Pragmatism, on the other hand, recognizes that we cannot analytically derive 
solutions to problems like mandatory arbitration and that any existing moral 
consensus regarding the rights lost in mandatory arbitration is too ambiguous to 
play the role that the reform advocates expect.268 It is a more circumspect, flexible 
doctrine. In fact, it recognizes that the less certainty we have regarding problems 
like mandatory arbitration, the more incentive we have to experiment.269 
To say that pragmatism is flexible and that it values experimentation, 
however, does not mean that it has to be value-neutral, which is one of the most 
frequent criticisms against pragmatism generally.270 To avoid this general 
criticism, I propose a goal-oriented version of pragmatism that seeks to improve 
                                                 
ground policy judgments on facts and consequences rather than on conceptualisms and 
generalities.”). I recognize that Posner discusses pragmatism mostly in the context of 
judicial decision-making, and that he would disagree with some, if not much, of what I 
propose, but I like his basic definition of pragmatism, so I am hijacking parts of it and 
applying it in the context of regulating mandatory arbitration. 
264 See POSNER, supra note 262, at 50 (stating that pragmatism is an “attitude that 
predisposes Americans to judge proposals by the criterion of what works”); see also 
Simon, supra note 240, at 177 (“Pragmatist practice is problem solving.”). 
265 RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 405 (1995); Simon, supra note 240, at 
177; see also Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 424 (1990) 
(stating that pragmatism “expresses a deep distrust for” formalism). 
266 See supra Part III. 
267 See supra Part IV. 
268 See Simon, supra note 240, at 177–78. 
269 See POSNER, MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 263, at 248 (“The less one 
thinks one knows the answers to difficult questions of policy, the more inclined one will be 
to encourage learning about them through experimentation and other methods of inquiry.”); 
see also Simon, supra note 240, at 177 (stating that solutions to public problems “are best 
derived deliberatively and experimentally”); Sullivan & Solove, supra note 13, at 704 
(“Pragmatists are committed to finding substantive sustenance for their guiding ideals 
through experiential inquiry.”). Some of the experiments might include expanding the 
review of awards, letting parties choose to have small claims courts handle certain matters, 
and prohibiting waivers of injunctive relief, consequential damages, or punitive damages, 
to name a few. 
270 BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY 41 (1997) (stating that 
the core problem with pragmatism is “its substantive emptiness”). 
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mandatory arbitration’s overall fairness through regulation.271 Stated differently, 
the pragmatism I propose says something about the ends we should pursue in 
mandatory arbitration.272 It attempts to resolve the conflict between companies that 
wish to mandate arbitration, on the one hand, and individuals that wish to avoid it, 
on the other, by continuing, but regulating, mandatory-arbitration’s use. In that 
sense, my proposal recognizes the changes that have occurred in arbitration over 
the last twenty-five years, but it also recognizes that Congress wanted to protect 
individuals from abusive practices when it passed the Federal Arbitration Act in 
1925.273 Thus, it is a middle-ground approach that takes arbitration’s history into 
account while recognizing the potential benefits of its current and future use.274 
This approach will allow us to study mandatory arbitration before deciding 
whether to eliminate it entirely.275 Empirical study, in fact, is one of the key 
principles276 of the pragmatic approach I propose because the existing empirical 
data on mandatory arbitration is limited.277 It would be helpful to know more about 
how much money mandatory arbitration saves companies, the extent to which 
those companies pass savings along to consumers, and how much it really reduces 
judicial caseloads, to name a few potential benefits.278 It would also be helpful to 
                                                 
271 I borrowed the idea that pragmatism need not be value-neutral from Sullivan & 
Solove, supra note 13, at 703 (“The pragmatist justifies her value commitments, in part, by 
analyzing their historical genesis.”). 
272 See id. at 703–04. 
273 See 1924 Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 14–15 (statements of Sen. Thomas 
Sterling, Chairman, Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary and Julius H. Cohen, 
General Counsel, N.Y. Chamber of Commerce); 1923 Hearings, supra note 14, at 9–10 
(statements of Sen. Thomas J. Walsh and W.H.H. Piatt, Chairman, Comm. of Commerce, 
Trade and Commercial Law, American Bar Ass’s). 
274 Thus, the pragmatism I propose is not ahistorical. It recognizes that we must look 
at arbitration’s history to determine what fairness and justice mean in the mandatory-
arbitration context. See Sullivan & Solove, supra note 13, at 703–04 (“The pragmatist 
justifies her value commitments, in part, by analyzing their historical genesis. Guiding 
ideals such as ‘fairness,’ ‘justice,’ and ‘freedom’ must be critically examined by looking to 
past experience.”). 
275 In other words, the pragmatism I propose is not a universalist prescription, but a 
suggestion for an approach that should be helpful given the political and legal climate 
surrounding mandatory arbitration. See Daria Roithmayr, “Easy for You to Say”: An Essay 
on Outsiders, the Usefulness of Reason, and Radical Pragmatism, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
939, 948 (2003). Other approaches may work better when that climate changes. 
276 It is one of the key principles of pragmatism generally. See POSNER, supra note 
265, at 11 (listing “empirical” as one of the adjectives Posner uses to describe pragmatism); 
Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatism for the Twenty-First Century, 
1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 163, 188 (stating that Brandeis “would have wanted a full view of the 
facts before making up his mind about possible remedies” and that “much can be learned 
from a more empirical approach”). 
277 Sternlight, supra note 216, at 1634 (explaining existing empirical data is “scant”). 
278 Empirical data could help resolve some ongoing disagreements over these issues. 
For example, Jean Sternlight and Stephen Ware disagree over the extent to which 
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continue studying mandatory arbitration’s affect on individual rights given that the 
end goal is to improve mandatory arbitration’s procedural fairness. This “critical 
assessment of our ends” will allow us to re-examine, among other things, where 
those ends came from, what they were responding to, and what type of results they 
have had on parties involved with mandatory arbitration.279 
In sum, adopting a pragmatic, regulatory approach would allow us to fill 
empirical gaps and continue examining our “end” goal of improving mandatory 
arbitration’s procedural fairness. This approach will no doubt be imperfect, but the 
mandatory-arbitration system we have now certainly is not ideal.280 Besides, if 
companies dislike the regulations adopted under this approach, they can always 
make an economic decision to remove mandatory-arbitration provisions from their 
contracts or to lobby the regulatory body for change. And, although the approach I 
propose is unquestionably better than what is currently available, individuals can 
lobby for change if they believe the new regulations don’t go far enough.281 In the 
end, this approach seeks to balance companies’ needs against individuals’ rights, 
hopefully in a manner that ultimately improves the overall public good. 
 
D.  Specific Regulations to Consider 
 
If a pragmatic, regulatory approach is the best approach for dealing with the 
mandatory arbitration problem, then the remaining task is to figure out what 
regulations to adopt. I propose five here: (1) an opt-out for small claims; (2) a new 
disclosure standard for arbitrators and arbitration providers aimed at reducing the 
repeat-player bias and increasing nondrafting parties’ control over the dispute 
resolution process; (3) a data-collection requirement for arbitration providers; (4) a 
                                                 
companies pass along cost-savings to consumers. See BRUNET ET AL., supra note 236, at 
329 n.68 (pointing out the lack of empirical data to support either side of the argument). 
279 See Sullivan & Solove, supra note 13, at 704–05. A regulatory approach can 
encourage these questions. Consider, for example, the Dodd-Frank bill that Congress 
passed in 2010. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 
4173, 111th Cong. (2010). The bill says that the Consumer Protection Financial Bureau 
must “conduct a study of, and shall provide a report to Congress concerning, the use of 
agreements providing for arbitration of any future dispute between covered persons and 
consumers in connection with the offering or providing of consumer financial products or 
services.” Id. § 1028. Hopefully the CPFB will take time to study and experiment (through 
regulation) with mandatory arbitration before deciding whether it should be eliminated 
(which the CPFB has the authority to do for disputes covered under the bill). 
280 The Supreme Court has taken us too far in one direction, and the reform advocates 
want to overcorrect in the other. See supra Parts I, II. 
281 Presumably this would occur through the same organizations that have been 
lobbying Congress for reform over the last fifteen years. According to Professor Simon, 
this type of associative democracy is one of the background principles of legal pragmatism. 
Simon, supra note 240, at 173, 175 (stating that associative democracy “is the idea that 
citizens should participate in the design and implementation of the policies that affect 
them” and that citizens’ “participation can take a variety of forms, but there is special 
emphasis on participation through nongovernmental organizations”). 
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prohibition on class-action waivers, substantively unconscionable forum-selection 
clauses, shorter statutes of limitations, and waivers of injunctive relief, 
consequential damages, or punitive damages; and (5) a slight expansion of the 
available judicial review. These are not comprehensive, by any means, but they are 
at the very least a good starting point for addressing some of the most glaring 
problems in the current mandatory-arbitration system. 
 
1.  Opt-Out for Small Claims 
 
First, consumers, employees, and franchisees should be able to opt-out of 
arbitration and have their claims heard in small claims court if their claims fall 
below the applicable court’s jurisdictional limit.282 Small claims courts generally 
are faster and less-expensive venues for resolving disputes.283 And they can be 
even less formal than arbitration, as parties often forego hiring an attorney and 
represent themselves.284 But those attributes are not the reason for providing the 
opt-out. The reason for providing the opt-out is that it will make the dispute-
resolution process seem fairer for the parties being subjected to it. They may weigh 
their options and proceed in the forum most suited to their claims, no longer being 
forced into a specific forum.285 By providing this option, the opt-out will enhance 
the process’s procedural justice because it will enhance parties’ control over the 
procedures used to resolve their disputes.286 
                                                 
282 The limit varies from state to state. See MARGARET C. JASPER, SMALL CLAIMS 
COURTS 39–40 (attaching an appendix showing the jurisdictional limits for each state as of 
2005). The American Arbitration Association (AAA) provides this option in its 
Supplementary Procedures for Consumer Related Disputes. See, Supplementary 
Procedures for Consumer-Related Disputes, AM. ARB. ASS’N, at r. C-1(d), 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22014 (last visited Nov. 9, 2011). The AAA provision 
obviously allows parties to opt out of arbitration even after the opposing party has filed the 
arbitration claim, an idea I support so long as the opt-out is made before the respondent’s 
answering statement is due under the applicable rules. Finally, Professor Blankley pointed 
out in her comments on this paper that “many” businesses already provide this option. 
283 JASPER, supra note 282, at vii, 22; Bruce Zucker & Monica Herr, The People’s 
Court Examined: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Small Claims Court System, 37 
U.S.F. L. REV. 315, 315–20 (2003). 
284 JASPER, supra note 282, at 2. Small claims courts have drawbacks as well. For 
example, they generally don’t allow losing plaintiffs to appeal. Id. at 22. 
285 The regulation should require drafting parties to reference the opt-out right in the 
arbitration provision and include a warning that the nondrafting parties should research the 
procedures of both arbitration and small claims court before deciding where to have their 
claims heard. The Consumer Due Process Protocol calls for the former, but not the latter. 
See Consumer Due Process Protocol, AM. ARB. ASS’N, at princs. 5, 11, 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22019 (last visited Nov. 9, 2011). 
286 See Donna Shestowsky & Jeanne Brett, Disputants’ Perceptions of Dispute 
Resolution Procedures: An Ex Ante and Ex Post Longitudinal Empirical Study, 41 CONN. 
L. REV. 63, 68–71 (2008) (discussing the importance of control in procedural justice). By 
increasing control, the opt-out will increase parties’ perceptions of how fair the process 
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2.  New Disclosure Standard 
 
Second, potential arbitrators should have to disclose to the nondrafting party 
basic information about the arbitrators’ prior five cases287 and arbitration providers 
should have to disclose the same information about the drafting party’s previous 
arbitrations before the provider.288 That information should include the following: 
 
 a very brief description of each case;  
 the prevailing party (without disclosing the party’s identity, unless 
that party is a party to the current case);  
 the relief awarded (if any);  
 the time elapsed between the claim statement and the ultimate award, 
settlement, or other disposition;  
 a copy of the written award (if any) with the parties’ identities 
redacted (except for the identities of parties to the current case);  
 a brief explanation of the type of hearing held (telephone, in-person, 
or a decision based on paper submissions);  
 whether the case was an “appeal” from the drafting party’s internal 
dispute-resolution system;  
 and the amount of arbitrator fees ultimately assigned to the 
nondrafting party.289  
                                                 
is—which enhances the process’s procedural justice. Although procedural justice doesn’t 
focus solely on parties’ subjective beliefs, subjective beliefs are a significant part of the 
procedural justice equation. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 66 (1988) (“A number of studies have found 
evidence of either direct or indirect enhancement of evaluations of legal outcomes when 
procedures are viewed as fair.”). 
287 The potential arbitrators should have to disclose this information for all cases 
involving the drafting party in the current case (i.e., not limited to the previous five cases). 
288 See generally ASS’N FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
ARBITRATION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2009, at 10 (2009) (recommending that “[a]ll arbitrator 
decisions involving a ‘repeat participant’ must be available upon request to all participants 
in a subsequent arbitration involving the repeat participant, but that information must be 
disclosed in such a manner that protects the privacy rights of the non-repeat participants in 
the prior arbitration.”); Consumer Due Process Protocol, supra note 285, at princ. 3 
(suggesting that parties should be provided with the names and contact information of the 
party representatives in each arbitrator’s last six arbitrations); Employment Due Process 
Protocol, AM. ARB. ASS’N, at B(3), C(4), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28535 (last visited 
Jan. 19, 2011). I prefer the objective information I call for over the party-representative 
contact information—called for in the Consumer and Employment Due Process Protocols. 
First, it will be difficult and time consuming to contact those parties and have them agree to 
discuss the proceedings. Second, their opinions may be colored by the outcome of the 
proceedings. Third, the quality of the information received from them will depend on their 
ability and willingness to communicate about the proceedings. 
289 For the arbitration provider, I would also require the names of the arbitrators in the 
drafting party’s previous cases. California requires arbitration providers to collect and 
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Requiring these disclosures will give nondrafting parties additional control over 
the arbitrator selection process and more information when deciding whether to 
settle disputes in arbitration or in small claims court (assuming small claims court 
is an option). It also may reduce the repeat-player bias by helping nondrafting 
parties avoid arbitrators who potentially exhibit that bias.290 Thus, this measure 
will enhance nondrafting parties’ control and their perceptions of the process’s 
overall fairness.291 
 
3.  Data-collection Requirement 
 
Third, arbitration providers should have to collect and organize the case 
information referenced in the previous paragraph, not only so that they can 
disclose it to the nondrafting party in each case, but also so that they can aggregate 
it and make it publicly available for additional empirical research. While the fate of 
mandatory arbitration should not hinge on these empirical studies—because 
empirical research may not be able to definitively prove whether mandatory 
arbitration is fair or unfair to nondrafting parties292—these studies do inform the 
debate on whether and how to continue modifying the process.293 Take Professor 
Lisa Bingham’s studies from the 1990s.294 These were the first studies to 
                                                 
publicly disclose this, and some of the other information referenced above, under its civil 
procedure code. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (2010). Additionally, I would 
require the arbitration provider to disclose any complaints filed against the potential 
arbitrators. 
290 Repeat-player employers appear to have an advantage in arbitration, but there is 
some question over whether that advantage comes from arbitrators favoring repeat players. 
See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst 
the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 427–32 (2007) (explaining that 
repeat-player employers fare better in arbitration than one-shot participants, but that 
multiple possible explanations exist for this phenomenon). Regardless, this disclosure 
requirement will reduce the importance of any such bias, because nondrafting parties will 
have a better chance of avoiding arbitrators who might exhibit it, thereby enhancing 
nondrafting parties’ perceptions of the process’s fairness. 
291 This disclosure requirement assumes the parties will be using the list selection 
method with each party having limited peremptory strikes and unlimited challenges for 
cause. Only if the parties are unable to select an arbitrator, or a panel of arbitrators, through 
this method should the arbitration provider complete the selection process. 
292 David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1247, 1336 (2009). 
293 See Karen A. Jordan, Empirical Studies of Judicial Decisions Serve an Important 
Role in the Cumulative Process of Policy Making, 31 IND. L. REV. 81, 88 (1998) 
(explaining how empirical studies help shape healthcare policy and stating that: 
“[E]mpirical research is, by nature, progressive. Each study yields discrete pieces of 
information relevant to overarching policy concerns.”). 
294 See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of 
Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 
223 (1998). 
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empirically show evidence of the repeat-player bias,295 and they undoubtedly have 
helped prompt calls for reform. Additional studies based on information gathered 
after any new regulations are enacted could have the same effect, or could show 
that the regulations are improving the process’s fairness to nondrafting parties. 
Either way, they will allow us to continue monitoring mandatory-arbitration 
outcomes from a larger sample size and compare those outcomes to the outcomes 
for similar cases in litigation.296 
 
4.  Certain Prohibitions  
 
Fourth, drafting parties should not be able to include class-action waivers, 
substantively unconscionable forum-selection clauses, shorter statutes of 
limitations, or restrictions on injunctive relief, consequential damages, or punitive 
damages in their agreements.297 The purposes of these types of provisions, 
obviously, are to limit the remedies available in arbitration and to make 
nondrafting parties’ claims more difficult to assert. They create economic 
disincentives to bringing claims, thereby increasing drafting parties’ chances of 
escaping liability.298 The major problem with this in mandatory arbitration, of 
course, is that the nondrafting parties have little to no ability to bargain over these 
terms, which reduces the process’s perceived and substantive fairness. Enacting 
these prohibitions will ensure that the remedies in arbitration are more comparable 
to the remedies in litigation and that drafting parties face similar liability risks in 
each forum.299 
                                                 
295 Colvin, supra note 290, at 427. 
296 Id. at 406 (noting that this is one of the critical issues in empirical research in 
employment arbitration); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Mandating Minimum Quality in 
Mass Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 383, 405 (2008) (“Regarding the key matter of 
quality, arbitration proponents proceed on the essentially unchallenged assumption that 
arbitration results are of at least equivalent quality as litigation results. The assumption 
should be scrutinized and tested empirically.”). 
297 See Stempel, supra note 296, at 413–15, 421. 
298 See id.; see also ASS’N FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 288, at 13, 65 
(calling for a ban on class-action waivers and stating that they fail to promote efficiency, 
lead to inconsistent decisions, discourage parties from filing claims, and remove public 
scrutiny of illegal practices); Richard A. Bales, The Employment Due Process Protocol at 
Ten: Twenty Unresolved Issues, and a Focus on Conflicts of Interests, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 165, 188 (2005) (listing class action waivers and shorter statutes of 
limitations as two of the problems that still need to be addressed). 
299 The Consumer Due Process Protocol addresses forum-selection clauses and the 
availability of remedies such as punitive damages. For the former, it says that parties 
should agree on a “reasonably convenient” location and that if they cannot agree on such a 
location then the provider should select the location for them. See Consumer Due Process 
Protocol, supra note 285, at princ. 7, reporter’s cmts. I support this rule, but I would also 
give the provider explicit authority to require telephone or online arbitration if the 
arbitrator finds (after the parties fail to reach an agreement on location) that form of 
arbitration appropriate under the circumstances. As to clauses that limit remedies, the 
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5.  Expansion of Judicial Review 
 
Finally, we should expand judicial review of arbitration awards for 
nondrafting parties under the manifest-disregard standard.300 Specifically, 
arbitrators should be required to issue written awards in mandatory arbitrations, 
and nondrafting parties should be able to challenge those awards for legal error.301 
While this change would make arbitration more expensive, the benefits of 
expanded review in this context outweigh its costs.302 In particular, expanding the 
manifest-disregard standard in this way would give nondrafting parties greater 
outcome control.303 They would finally have a viable way to correct arbitrators’ 
mistakes, thus making the process fairer and enhancing its procedural justice.304 
Overall, these regulations increase nondrafting parties’ options, give them 
additional information about the arbitration process, and provide safeguards 
against drafting parties’ overreaching. They may increase arbitration’s costs, and 
some of them may be ineffective, but the need to improve mandatory arbitration’s 
fairness overrides these concerns, and the benefit to regulating mandatory 
arbitration—instead of eliminating it—is that we can experiment with regulations 
until we figure out what, exactly, works. In any event, these regulations should at 
                                                 
Consumer Due Process Protocol says that arbitrators should “have broad authority to 
fashion relief appropriate to the circumstances” and that such authority “is limited only by 
the agreement of the parties and the scope of submission to arbitration.” Id. at princ. 14, 
reporter’s cmts. Thus, it says that arbitrators should respect contractual waivers of relief. 
This is problematic in mandatory arbitration because the nondrafting party cannot bargain 
over these types of terms. I do not believe, therefore, that we should allow such terms to 
stand. See Stempel, supra note 296, at 413, 437; see also Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive 
Damages and the Consumerization of Arbitration, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 33–36 (1997) 
(arguing that waivers of punitive damages are against public policy). 
300 See Thomas V. Burch, Manifest Disregard and the Imperfect Procedural Justice of 
Arbitration, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 47, 75–82 (2010) (calling for an expansion of this standard 
of review). 
301 Reasoned opinions would increase arbitration’s costs, but they would also make it 
easier to determine if an arbitrator actually disregarded the law, which is difficult to 
determine under the current standard applied by most courts. Id. at 62–63, 81–82. This 
expanded-review proposal would still work without the reasoned-opinion requirement. But 
it would be less efficient and less likely to result in vacated awards. Id. at 82 n.230. 
302 Id. at 75–82. One way to stem those costs would be to explicitly make sanctions 
available for frivolous appeals—using an objective, not subjective standard. This should 
reduce the number of pro forma appeals. Id. at 79–80. 
303 See id. at 76. 
304 Id. at 82; see also Debra L. Shapiro & Jeanne M. Brett, Comparing Three 
Processes Underlying Judgments of Procedural Justice: A Field Study of Mediation and 
Arbitration, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1167, 1167 (1993) (discussing the 
importance of control in procedural justice); John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of 
Procedure, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 541, 546 (1978) (“The distribution of control among the 
procedural group participants is the most significant factor in characterizing a procedural 
system.”). 
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the very least be a good starting point for addressing some of the more glaring 
problems with the current mandatory-arbitration system and they should, if 
enacted, reduce calls for mandatory arbitration’s elimination, thus preserving it as 
an alternative method of resolving disputes for drafting parties while making it 
fairer for the nondrafting parties subjected to it. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Both the Supreme Court’s arbitration formalism and the reform advocates’ 
arbitration liberalism are too rigid. One relies on flawed, deductive reasoning to 
mechanically enforce arbitration agreements; the other demands mandatory 
arbitration’s elimination without considering reforms that could make it a more 
rights-oriented process. A pragmatic, regulatory approach, on the other hand, 
values experimentation and study and has an end goal of improving mandatory 
arbitration’s overall fairness. Given the positive effect that mandatory arbitration 
can (possibly) have on the public good, this approach is the best way to resolve the 
current discord surrounding mandatory arbitration because it balances companies’ 
needs against individuals’ rights. 
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VI.  APPENDIX 
 
Bill Name Relevant Purpose of Bill Final Bill Status 
Federal Fair Franchise 
Practices Act, H.R. 1717, 
104th Cong. (1995) 
Section 9 of the bill would 
have precluded franchisors 
from “exclud[ing] collective 
action by franchisees to 
settle like disputes arising 
from violation of this Act 
either by civil action or 
arbitration.” 
Referred to Judiciary 
Committee. 
Civil Rights Procedures 
Protection Act of 1995, 
S. 366, 104th Cong. (1995). 
To “amend certain Federal 
civil rights statutes to 
prevent the involuntary 
application of arbitration to 
claims that arise from 
unlawful employment 
discrimination based on 
race, color, religion, sex, 
national origin, age, or 
disability, and for other 
purposes.”305 
Referred to Committee on 
Labor and Human 
Resources. 
Civil Rights Procedures 
Protection Act of 1996, 
H.R. 3748, 104th Cong. 
(1996) 
Same as other CRPPA 
bill.306 
Referred to (1) Judiciary 
Committee’s Subcommittee 
on Constitution, and (2) 




Fairness and Voluntary 
Arbitration Act of 1996, 
H.R. 3422, 104th Cong. 
(1996). 
To “amend chapter 1 of title 
9 of the United States Code 
to permit each party to 
certain contracts to accept or 
reject arbitration as a means 
of settling disputes under the 
contracts.” 
Referred to Judiciary 
Committee’s Subcommittee 
on Commercial and 
Administrative Law. 
Civil Rights Procedures 
Protection Act of 1996, 
H.R. 983, 105th Cong. 
Same as prior CRPPA bills. Referred to (1) Education 
and the Workforce 
Committee’s 
                                                 
305 Specifically, the bill applied to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Americans 
With Disabilities Act of 1990, the equal pay requirement under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act of 1938, and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993. See Civil Rights Procedures 
Protection Act of 1995, S. 366, 104th Cong. (1995). 
306 By saying that this bill has the same purpose as the previous one introduced, I am 
not saying that the bill is completely unchanged. There may be some amendments to it 
from the previous version. For our purposes, I’m simply focusing on the overall purpose of 
the bill as it relates to arbitration. 
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Bill Name Relevant Purpose of Bill Final Bill Status 
(1997). Subcommittees on (a) 
Employer-Employee 
Relations, (b) Workforce 
Protections, and (c) 
Postsecondary Education, 
Training and Life-Long 
Learning; and (2) Judiciary 
Committee’s Subcommittee 
on the Constitution. 
Civil Rights Procedures 
Protection Act of 1997, 
S. 63, 105th Cong. (1997). 
Same as prior CRPPA bills. Referred to Committee on 
Labor and Human 
Resources. 
Federal Fair Franchise 
Practices Act of 1997, 
H.R. 2954, 105th Cong. 
(1997). 
Same as prior FFFPA bill. Referred to Judiciary 
Committee’s Subcommittee 
on Commercial and 
Administrative Law. 
Fairness and Voluntary 
Arbitration Act of 1998, 
H.R. 2882, 105th Cong. 
(1998). 
Same as prior FVAA bill. Referred to Judiciary 
Committee’s Subcommittee 
on Commercial and 
Administrative Law. 
Motor Vehicle Franchise 
Contract Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 1998, 
S. 2434, 105th Cong. 
(1998). 
To “amend chapter 1 of title 
9, United States Code, to 
provide for greater fairness 
in the arbitration process 
relating to motor vehicle 
franchise contracts.”307 
Referred to Judiciary 
Committee’s Subcommittee 
on Oversight and Courts. 
Small Business Franchise 
Act of 1998, H.R. 4841, 
105th Cong. (1998). 
Section 6 would have 
prohibited franchisors from 
preventing franchisees, 
either in court or in 
arbitration, “from 
participating as a member of 
a class permitted by Rule 23 
of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure or applicable 
State law.” 
Referred to Judiciary 
Committee’s Subcommittee 
on Commercial and 
Administrative Law. 
Small Business Franchise 
Act of 1999, H.R. 3308, 
106th Cong. (1999). 
Same as prior SBFA bill. Referred to Judiciary 
Committee’s Subcommittee 
on Commercial and 
Administrative Law. 
A Bill to Amend Title 9, 
United States Code, to 
Allow Employees the Right 
The title is pretty self-
explanatory. Section 1 
would have allowed both 
Referred to Judiciary 
Committee’s Subcommittee 
on Commercial and 
                                                 
307 The bill would have allowed parties to opt out of arbitration and, if parties chose to 
proceed with arbitration, it would have required the arbitrator to issue a written award. 
Motor Vehicle Franchise Control Arbitration Fairness Act of 1998, S. 2434, 105th Cong. § 
2(a) (1998). 
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Bill Name Relevant Purpose of Bill Final Bill Status 
to Accept or Reject the Use 
of Arbitration to Resolve an 
Employment Controversy, 
H.R. 613, 106th Cong. 
(1999). 
parties to choose whether to 
arbitrate after the dispute 
arose. 
Administrative Law. 
Consumer Fairness Act of 
1999, H.R. 2258, 
106th Cong. (1999). 
To “treat arbitration clauses 
which are unilaterally 
imposed on consumers as an 
unfair and deceptive trade 
practice and prohibit their 
use in consumer 
transactions.” 
Referred to Committee on 
Banking and Financial 
Services’ Subcommittee on 
Financial Institutions and 
Consumer Credit. 
Civil Rights Procedures 
Protection Act of 1999, 
H.R. 872, 106th Cong. 
(1999). 
Same as prior CRPPA bills. Referred to (1) Judiciary 
Committee’s Subcommittee 
on the Constitution; and (2) 
Committee on Education 
and the Workforce’s 
Subcommittees on (a) 
Employer-Employee 
Relations, (b) Workforce 
Protections, and (c) 
Postsecondary Education, 
Training and Life-Long 
Learning. 
Civil Rights Procedures 
Protection Act of 1999, 
S. 121, 106th Cong. (1999). 
Same as prior CRPPA bills. Referred to Committee on 
Health, Education, Labor, 
and Pensions. 
Motor Vehicle Franchise 
Contract Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 1999, S. 
1020, 106th Cong. (1999). 
Same as prior MVFCAFA 
bill. 
Referred to Judiciary 
Committee. 
Motor Vehicle Franchise 
Contract Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 2000, H.R. 
534, 106th Cong. (2000). 
Same as prior MVFCAFA 
bills. 
Passed the House. 
Anti-Predatory Lending Act 
of 2000, H.R. 3901, 
106th Cong. (2000).308 
Section 3(j) would have 
amended the Truth in 
Lending Act to prohibit 
mandatory arbitration 
provisions in high cost 
mortgages. 
Referred to Banking and 
Financial Services 
Committee’s Subcommittee 
on Financial Institutions and 
Consumer Credit. 
Predatory Lending 
Deterrence Act, S. 2405, 
Section 4(j) would have 
amended the Truth in 
Referred to Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and 
                                                 
308 This bill, and the multiple other bills like it that were introduced in subsequent 
years, may have been prompted by a HUD investigation and report on predatory lending 
practices. See OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN 
DEV., CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 98–99 (2000). 
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106th Cong. (2000). Lending Act to prohibit 
mandatory arbitration in 
mortgage agreements 
covered by Section 103(aa). 
Urban Affairs. 
Consumer Credit Fair 
Dispute Resolution Act of 
2000, S. 2117, 106th Cong. 
(2000). 
To “amend title 9, United 
States Code, with respect to 
consumer credit 
transactions.”309 
Referred to the Judiciary 
Committee. 
Consumer and Employee 
Arbitration Bill of Rights, 
S. 3210, 106th Cong. 
(2000). 
To “amend chapter 1 of title 
9, United States Code, to 
provide for greater fairness 
in the arbitration process for 
consumers and 
employees.”310 
Referred to the Judiciary 
Committee. 
Financial Consumers Bill of 
Rights Act, H.R. 4332, 
106th Cong. (2000). 
Section 8 of the bill would 
have prohibited pre-dispute 
arbitration provisions in 
“any consumer transaction 
or consumer contract.” 
Referred to (1) Banking and 
Financial Services’ 
Subcommittee on Financial 
Institutions and Consumer 
Credit, and (2) Commerce 
Committee’s Subcommittee 
on Finance and Hazardous 
Materials. 
American Homebuyer’s 
Protection Act, H.R. 5033, 
106th Cong. (2000). 
To “prohibit offering 
homebuilding purchase 
contracts that contain in a 
single document both a 
mandatory arbitration 
agreement and other contract 
provisions and to prohibit 
requiring purchasers to 
consent to a mandatory 
arbitration agreement as a 
Referred to Committee on 
Banking and Financial 
Services’ Subcommittee on 
Housing and Community 
Opportunity. 
                                                 
309 Specifically, Section 2 of the bill would have precluded parties from including 
arbitration provisions in consumer credit agreements. However, it would have allowed 
parties to agree to arbitration after the dispute arose. See Consumer Credit Fair Dispute 
Resolution Act of 2000, S. 2117, 106th Cong. § 2(b) (2000). 
310 This bill would have required arbitration clauses to: (1) have their headings in 
bold, capital letters; (2) state whether arbitration is mandatory or optional; (3) provide 
contact information for a source where contracting parties can get more information on the 
arbitration process; and (4) allow parties to have the option of resolving disputes under 
$50,000 in small claims court. It also entitled parties to: (1) competent and neutral 
arbitrators; (2) representation and a fair hearing; (3) present evidence, cross-examine 
witnesses, and have a record of the proceedings; and (4) timely resolution and a written 
award. See Consumer and Employee Arbitration Bill of Rights, S.3210, 106th Cong. § 
2(b), (c) (2000). It is the same as the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2002, S. 3026, 107th 
Cong. (2002) and the Fair Arbitration Act of 2007, S.1135, 110th Cong. (2007). All three 
were introduced by Jeff Sessions. 
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condition precedent to 
entering into a homebuilding 
purchase contract.”311 
American Homebuyer’s 
Protection Act, H.R. 2053, 
107th Cong. (2001). 
Same as prior AHPA bill. Referred to Committee on 
Banking and Financial 
Services’ Subcommittee on 
Housing and Community 
Opportunity. 
A Bill to Amend Title 9, 
United States Code, to 
Allow Employees the Right 
to Accept or Reject the Use 
of Arbitration to Resolve an 
Employment Controversy, 
H.R. 815, 107th Cong. 
(2001). 
Same as the prior version of 
the bill. 
Referred to Judiciary 
Committee’s Subcommittee 
on Commercial and 
Administrative Law. 
Motor Vehicle Franchise 
Contract Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 2001, S. 
1140, 107th Cong. (2001). 
Same as prior MVFCAFA 
bills. 
House version (H.R. 1296) 
passed the Senate and 
House. Signed by President 
Bush.312 
Motor Vehicle Franchise 
Contract Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 2001, H.R. 
1296, 107th Cong. (2001). 
Same as prior MVFCAFA 
bills. 
Passed the Senate and 
House. Signed by President 
Bush.313 
Civil Rights Procedures 
Protection Act of 2001, 
H.R. 1489, 107th Cong. 
(2001). 
Same as prior CRPPA bills. Referred to (1) Education 
and the Workforce 
Committee’s 
Subcommittees on (a) 
Employer-Employee 
Relations, and (b) 
Workforce Protections; and 
(2) Judiciary Committee’s 
Subcommittee on 
Constitution. 
Civil Rights Procedures 
Protection Act of 2001, S. 
163, 107th Cong. (2001). 
Same as prior CRPPA bills. Referred to Health, 
Education, Labor, and 
Pensions Committee. 
Securing a Future for 
Independent Agriculture 
Act of 2001, S. 20, 107th 
Section 128(b) would have 
prohibited mandatory 
arbitration of future disputes 
Referred to Committee on 
Agriculture, Nutrition and 
Forestry. 
                                                 
311 This bill would have allowed homebuilders and their customers to arbitrate their 
disputes, but only if the customers signed a separate contract agreeing to arbitration that is 
not a condition precedent to the homebuilding contract. See American Homebuyer’s 
Protection Act, H.R. 5033, 106th Cong. § 2(a), (b) (2000). 
312 See 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (2006). 
313 Id.  
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Cong. (2001). between producers and 
“covered persons or 
contractors.” 
Consumer Credit Fair 
Dispute Resolution Act of 
2001, S. 192, 107th Cong. 
(2001). 
Same as prior CCFDRA bill. Referred to Judiciary 
Committee. 
Save Our Homes Act, H.R. 
2531, 107th Cong. (2001). 
Section 3(j) of the bill would 
have amended the Truth in 
Lending Act to prohibit 
lenders from including in 
high cost mortgages a 
“mandatory arbitration 
clause [that] limits in any 
way the right of the 
borrower to seek relief 
through the judicial 
process.” 
Referred to the Committee 
on Financial Services’ 
Subcommittee on Financial 
Institutions and Consumer 
Credit. 
Truth in Savings 
Enhancement Act of 2001, 
H.R. 1057, 107th Cong. 
(2001). 
Section 3(d) of the bill 
would have amended the 
Truth in Savings Act to 
prohibit depository 
institutions from requiring 
binding arbitration of 
disputes with consumers. 
Referred to the Committee 
on Financial Services’ 
Subcommittee on Financial 
Institutions and Consumer 
Credit. 
Truth in Lending 
Modernization Act of 2001, 
H.R. 1054, 107th Cong. 
(2001). 
Section 6(a) of the bill 
would have amended the 
Truth in Lending Act to 
prohibit creditors from 
requiring binding arbitration 
of disputes with consumers. 
Referred to the Committee 
on Financial Services’ 
Subcommittee on Financial 
Institutions and Consumer 
Credit. 
Protecting our Communities 
from Predatory Lending 
Practices Act, H.R. 3607, 
107th Cong. (2001). 
Section 3(a) of the bill 
would have amended the 
Truth in Lending Act to 
prohibit arbitration “in any 
contract for the extension of 
consumer credit secured by 
the consumer’s dwelling.” 
 
Referred to the Committee 
on Financial Services’ 
Subcommittee on Financial 
Institutions and Consumer 
Credit. 
Predatory Lending 
Consumer Protection Act of 
2001, H.R. 1051, 107th 
Cong. (2001). 
Section 4(g) of the bill 
would have amended the 
Truth in Lending Act to 
prohibit arbitration 
provisions in high-cost 
mortgage contracts. 
Referred to the Committee 
on Financial Services’ 
Subcommittee on Financial 
Institutions and Consumer 
Credit. 
Payday Borrower Protection 
Act of 2001, H.R. 1319, 
107th Cong. (2001). 
Section 4(b)(6)(h) would 
have amended the Consumer 
Credit Protection Act to 
Referred to the Committee 
on Financial Services’ 
Subcommittee on Financial 
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prohibit arbitration 
provisions in deferred 
deposit loans. 
Institutions and Consumer 
Credit. 
Preservation of Civil Rights 
Protections Act of 2001, 
H.R. 2282, 107th Cong. 
(2001). 
To “amend title 9 of the 
United States Code to 
exclude all employment 
contracts from the 
arbitration provisions of 
chapter 1 of such title . . . .” 
Referred to (1) Judiciary 
Committee’s Subcommittee 
on Commercial and 
Administrative Law, and (2) 





Preservation of Civil Rights 
Protections Act of 2002, S. 
2435, 107th Cong. (2002). 
Same as other PCRPA bill. Referred to Health, 
Education, Labor, and 
Pensions Committee. 
Genetically Engineered 
Crop and Animal Farmer 
Protection Act of 2002, 
H.R. 4812, 107th Cong. 
(2002). 
Section 4(b)(5) would have 
prohibited mandatory 
arbitration between biotech 
companies and purchasers of 
genetically engineered 
plants, animals, or seeds. 
Referred to Agriculture 
Committee’s Subcommittee 
on General Farm 
Commodities and Risk 
Management. 
INFORM Act of 2002, S. 
2032, 107th Cong. (2002). 
Section 404 would have 
amended ERISA to prohibit 
pre-dispute mandatory 
arbitration clauses. 
Referred to Health, 
Education, Labor, and 
Pensions Committee. 
Employee Pension Freedom 
Act of 2002, H.R. 3657, 
107th Cong. (2002). 
Section 404 would have 
amended ERISA to prohibit 
pre-dispute mandatory 
arbitration clauses. 
Referred to Education and 





Protection Act of 2002, S. 
1919, 107th Cong. (2002). 
Section 405 would have 
amended ERISA to prohibit 
pre-dispute mandatory 
arbitration clauses. 
Referred to Health, 
Education, Labor, and 
Pensions Committee’s 
Subcommittee on Water and 
Power. Hearings held. 
Protecting America’s 
Pensions Act of 2002, S. 
1992, 107th Cong. (2002). 
Section 306 would have 
amended ERISA to prohibit 
pre-dispute mandatory 
arbitration clauses. 
Referred to Health, 
Education, Labor, and 
Pensions Committee. 
Committee consideration 
and mark-up session held. 
Reported out favorably as 
amended. Placed on Senate 
Legislative Calendar under 
General Orders. 
Predatory Lending 
Consumer Protection Act of 
2002, S. 2438, 107th Cong. 
(2002). 
Same as prior PLCPA bill. Referred to Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs. 
1362 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4 
Bill Name Relevant Purpose of Bill Final Bill Status 
Consumer Fairness Act of 
2002, H.R. 5162, 107th 
Cong. (2002). 
Same as prior CFA bill. Referred to Banking and 
Financial Services 
Committee’s Subcommittee 
on Financial Institutions and 
Consumer Credit. 
Arbitration Fairness Act of 
2002, S. 3026, 107th Cong. 
(2002). 
To “amend chapter 1 of title 
9, United States Code, to 
provide for greater fairness 
in the arbitration process.”314 
Referred to Judiciary 
Committee. 
Fair Contracts for Growers 
Act of 2002, S. 2943, 107th 
Cong. (2002). 
To “amend title 9, United 
States Code, to provide for 
greater fairness in the 
arbitration process relating 
to livestock and poultry 
contracts.”315 
Referred to Judiciary 
Committee. 
Fair Contracts for Growers 
Act of 2003, S. 91, 108th 
Cong. (2003). 
Same as prior FCGA bill. Referred to Judiciary 
Committee. 
American Homebuyer’s 
Protection Act, H.R. 3414, 
108th Cong. (2003). 
Same as prior AHPA bills. Referred to Committee on 
Banking and Financial 
Services’ Subcommittee on 
Housing and Community 
Opportunity. 
 
A Bill to Amend Title 9, 
United States Code, to 
Allow Employees the Right 
to Accept or Reject the Use 
of Arbitration to Resolve an 
Employment Controversy, 
H.R. 540, 108th Cong. 
(2003). 
Same as the prior versions of 
the bill. 
Referred to Judiciary 
Committee’s Subcommittee 
on Commercial and 
Administrative Law. 
Consumer Fairness Act of 
2003, H.R. 1887, 108th 
Cong. (2003). 
Same as prior CFA bills. Referred to Committee on 
Banking and Financial 
Services’ Subcommittee on 




Reduction Act, H.R. 1663, 
Section 1003 would have 
amended the Consumer 
Credit Protection Act to 
Referred to Committee on 
Banking and Financial 
Services’ Subcommittee on 
                                                 
314 This is basically the same bill as the Consumer and Employee Arbitration Bill of 
Rights, S. 3210, 106th Cong. (2000) and the Fair Arbitration Act of 2007, S. 1135, 110th 
Cong. (2007). 
315 This bill would allow arbitration under livestock and poultry contracts only if the 
parties agreed to arbitrate after the dispute arose. It would also require the arbitrator to 
issue a written award. See Fair Contracts for Growers Act of 2002, S. 2943, 107th Cong. § 
2(b), (c) (2002). 
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108th Cong. (2003). prohibit “arbitration clauses 
imposed on consumers 
without their consent.” 
Financial Institutions and 
Consumer Credit. 
Responsible Lending Act, 
H.R. 833, 108th Cong. 
(2003). 
Section 102(e) would have 
amended the Truth in 
Lending Act to prohibit 
“oppressive, unfair, [or] 
unconscionable” mandatory-
arbitration clauses.316 
Referred to Committee on 
Banking and Financial 
Services’ Subcommittees on 
(a) Housing and Community 
Opportunity and (b) 
Financial Institutions and 
Consumer Credit. 
Predatory Lending 
Consumer Protection Act of 
2003, S. 1928, 108th Cong. 
(2003). 
Same as prior PLCPA bills. Referred to Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs. 
Mutual Fund Investor 
Protection Act of 2003, S. 
1958, 108th Cong. (2003). 
Section 209 would have 
allowed investors to have 
complaints heard in “an 
independent arbitration 
forum . . . .” of the investor’s 
choice. 
Referred to Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs 
Committee.  
Employee Benefits 
Protection Act of 2003, 
H.R. 1397, 108th Cong. 
(2003). 
Section 6 would have 
amended ERISA to prohibit 
pre-dispute mandatory 
arbitration agreements. 
Referred to Education and 




Payday Borrower Protection 
Act of 2003, H.R. 2407, 
108th Cong. (2003). 
Same as prior PBPA bill. Referred to the Committee 
on Financial Services’ 
Subcommittee on Financial 




Crop and Animal Farmer 
Protection Act of 2003, 
H.R. 2918, 108th Cong. 
(2003). 
Same as prior GECAFPA 
bill. 
Referred to Agriculture 
Committee’s Subcommittee 
on Conservation, Credit, 
Rural Development and 
Research. 
Taxpayer Abuse Prevention 
Act, H.R. 5340, 108th 
Cong. (2004). 
Section 4 would have 
prevented mandatory 
arbitration provisions in loan 
agreements linked to 
anticipated tax refunds. 
Referred to (1) Ways and 
Means Committee, and (2) 
Banking and Financial 
Services Committee’s 
Subcommittee on Financial 
Institutions and Consumer 
Credit. 
Taxpayer Abuse Prevention Same as other TAPA bill. Referred to Finance 
                                                 
316 Section 102 has a safe-harbor provision that exempts arbitration provisions so long 
as they meet the listed requirements (e.g., forum in federal judicial district where property 
is located). 
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Act, S. 2947, 108th Cong. 
(2004). 
Committee. 
Fairness and Individual 
Rights Necessary to Ensure 
a Stronger Society: Civil 
Rights Act of 2004, S. 
2088, 108th Cong. (2004). 
Section 513 would have 
prohibited arbitration 
provisions in employment 
contracts. 
Referred to Health, 
Education, Labor, and 
Pensions Committee. 
Fairness and Individual 
Rights Necessary to Ensure 
a Stronger Society: Civil 
Rights Act of 2004, H.R. 
3809, 108th Cong. (2004). 
Same as other FAIRNESS 
bill. 
Referred to (1) Judiciary 
Committee’s Subcommittee 
on Constitution; (2) 
Education and Workforce 
Committee’s 
Subcommittees on (a) 
Employer-Employee 
Relations, (b) Workforce 
Protections, (c) 21st Century 
Competitiveness, and (d) 
Education Reform; and (3) 
Transportation and 
Infrastructure Committee’s 
Subcommittee on Aviation. 
Prohibit Predatory Lending 
Act, H.R. 3974, 108th 
Cong. (2004). 
Section 4(d) of the bill 
would have amended the 
Truth in Lending Act to 
prohibit arbitration 
provisions in high-cost 
mortgage contracts. 
Referred to Committee on 
Banking and Financial 
Services’ Subcommittees on 
(a) Housing and Community 
Opportunity and (b) 
Financial Institutions and 
Consumer Credit. 
Mutual Fund Reform Act of 
2004, H.R. 4505, 108th 
Cong. (2004). 
Section 404 called for a 
study and report on the trend 
in arbitration clauses and 
other “means to avert the 
filing of claims in Federal or 
State courts” since Dec. 31, 
1995. 
Referred to Committee on 
Banking and Financial 
Services’ Subcommittee on 
Capital Markets, Insurance, 
and Government Sponsored 
Enterprises. 
Mutual Fund Reform Act of 
2004, S. 2059, 108th Cong. 
(2004). 
Same as other MFRA bill. Referred to Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs. 
Save Our Homes Act, H.R. 
3322, 108th Cong. (2004). 
Same as prior SOHA bill. Referred to Committee on 
Banking and Financial 
Services’ Subcommittees on 
(1) Financial Institutions 
and Consumer Credit and 
(2) Housing and 
Community Opportunity. 
Taxpayer Abuse Prevention 
Act, H.R. 969, 109th Cong. 
(2005). 
Same as prior TAPA bills. Referred to (1) Ways and 
Means Committee, and (2) 
Banking and Financial 
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Services Committee’s 
Subcommittee on Financial 
Institutions and Consumer 
Credit. 
Taxpayer Abuse Prevention 
Act, S. 324, 109th Cong. 
(2005). 
Same as prior TAPA bills. Referred to Finance 
Committee. 
American Homebuyer’s 
Protection Act, H.R. 4037, 
109th Cong. (2005). 
Same as prior AHPA bills. Referred to Committee on 
Banking and Financial 
Services’ Subcommittee on 
Housing and Community 
Opportunity. 
A Bill to Amend Title 9, 
United States Code, to 
Allow Employees the Right 
to Accept or Reject the Use 
of Arbitration to Resolve an 
Employment Controversy, 
H.R. 3651, 109th Cong. 
(2005). 
Same as the prior versions of 
the bill. 
Referred to Judiciary 
Committee’s Subcommittee 
on Commercial and 
Administrative Law. 
Fair Contracts for Growers 
Act of 2005, S. 2131, 109th 
Cong. (2005). 
Same as prior FCGA bills. Referred to Judiciary 
Committee. 
Preservation of Civil Rights 
Protections Act of 2005, 
H.R. 2969, 109th Cong. 
(2005). 
Same as prior PCRPA bills. Referred to (1) Judiciary 
Committee’s Subcommittee 
on Constitution, and (2) 







Reduction Act, H.R. 1994, 
109th Cong. (2005). 
Same as prior PMLPRA bill. Referred to Committee on 
Banking and Financial 
Services. 
Borrower’s Bill of Rights 
Act, H.R. 1643, 109th 
Cong. (2005). 
Section 27(b) would have 
prohibited pre-dispute 
mandatory arbitration 
agreements in consumer 
lending agreements. 
Referred to (1) Committee 
on Banking and Financial 
Services, and (2) Judiciary 
Committee’s Subcommittee 
on Commercial and 
Administrative Law. 
Prohibit Predatory Lending 
Act, H.R. 1182, 109th 
Cong. (2005). 
Section 7 would have 
amended the Truth in 
Lending Act to prohibit 
arbitration provisions in a 
“consumer credit transaction 
that is secured by the 
consumer’s principal 
Referred to Committee on 
Banking and Financial 
Services’ Subcommittees on 
(1) Financial Institutions 
and Consumer Credit and 
(2) Housing and 
Community Opportunity. 
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dwelling . . . .” 
Employee Benefits 
Protection Act of 2005, 
H.R. 1058, 109th Cong. 
(2005). 
Same as prior EBPA bill. Referred to Education and 




Payday Borrower Protection 
Act of 2005, H.R. 1660, 
109th Cong. (2005). 
Same as prior PBPA bills. Referred to the Committee 
on Financial Services’ 
Subcommittee on Financial 
Institutions and Consumer 
Credit. 
Fair and Responsible 
Lending Act, H.R. 4471, 
109th Cong. (2005). 
Section 104 would have 
amended the Truth in 
Lending Act to prohibit pre-
dispute mandatory 
arbitration agreements. 
Referred to the Committee 
on Banking and Financial 
Services. 
Competitive and Fair 
Agricultural Markets Act of 
2006, S. 2307, 109th Cong. 
(2006). 
Section 101 would have 
created a new section 202(b) 
in the Agricultural Fair 
Practices Act of 1967 to 
make pre-dispute mandatory 
arbitration clauses in 
livestock and poultry 
contracts unenforceable. 
Referred to Agriculture, 
Nutrition, and Forestry 
Committee. 
Genetically Engineered 
Crop and Animal Farmer 
Protection Act, H.R. 5266, 
109th Cong. (2006). 
Same as prior GECAFPA 
bill. 
Referred to Agriculture 
Committee’s Subcommittee 
on Conservation, Credit, 
Rural Development and 
Research. 
John Warner National 
Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2007, H.R. 
5122, 109th Cong. (2006). 
Section 670 made pre-
dispute arbitration 
agreements unenforceable 
against military members 
and their dependents in 
consumer credit disputes.317 
Passed in both House and 
Senate. Signed by President 
Bush. 
Taxpayer Abuse Prevention 
Act, S. 1133, 110th Cong. 
(2007). 
Same as other TAPA bills. Referred to Finance 
Committee. 
Arbitration Fairness Act of 
2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. 
(2007). 
The AFA’s broad, stated 
goal was to “amend chapter 
1 of title 9 of United States 
Referred to Judiciary 
Committee’s Subcommittee 
on the Constitution. 
                                                 
317 See John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, 10 
U.S.C. § 987(f)(4) (2006). 
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Code with respect to 
arbitration.”318 
Hearings held. 
Arbitration Fairness Act of 
2007, H.R. 3010, 110th 
Cong. (2007). 
Same as other AFA bill. Referred to Judiciary 
Committee’s Subcommittee 




and mark-up. Subcommittee 
then forwarded it to full 
Committee by voice vote. 
Fair Arbitration Act of 
2007, S. 1135, 110th Cong. 
(2007). 
To “amend chapter 1 of title 
9, United States Code, to 
establish fair procedures for 
arbitration clauses in 
contracts.”319 
Referred to Judiciary 
Committee. 
Consumer Fairness Act of 
2007, H.R. 1443, 110th 
Cong. (2007). 
Same as prior CFA bills. Referred to Committee on 




Reduction Act, H.R. 2061, 
110th Cong. (2007). 
Same as prior PMLPRA 
bills. 
Referred to Committee on 
Banking and Financial 
Services. 
American Homebuyer’s 
Protection Act, H.R. 1519, 
110th Cong. (2007). 
Same as prior AHPA bills. Referred to (1) Committee 
on Banking and Financial 
Services, and (2) Energy 
and Commerce Committee’s 
Subcommittee on 
Commerce, Trade, and 
Consumer Protection. 
Fair Contracts for Growers 
Act of 2007, S. 221, 110th 
Cong. (2007). 
Same as prior FCGA bill. Referred to Judiciary 
Committee. Reported out of 
Committee and placed on 
Senate calendar under 
General Orders. 
Reservists Access to Justice 
Act of 2007, H.R. 3393, 
110th Cong. (2007). 
Section 3 would have 
amended Chapter 43 of Title 
38 of the U.S. Code to make 
Chapter 1 of Title 9 
inapplicable to employment 
and reemployment claims 
Referred to Veterans’ 
Affairs Committee’s 
Subcommittee on Economic 
Opportunity. Hearings held. 
                                                 
318 More specifically, it prohibits pre-dispute arbitration agreements for employment 
disputes, consumer disputes, franchise disputes, disputes under statutes that protect civil 
rights, and disputes under contracts between parties with unequal bargaining power. 
319 This is basically the same bill as the Consumer and Employee Arbitration Bill of 
Rights, S. 3210, 106th Cong. (2000) and the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2002, S. 3026, 
107th Cong. (2002).  
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under Chapter 43. 
Helping Families Save 
Their Homes in Bankruptcy 
Act of 2007, S. 2136, 110th 
Cong. (2007). 
Section 203 would have 
amended Section 1328 of 
Title 28 of the U.S. Code to 
say: “Notwithstanding any 
agreement for arbitration 
that is subject to chapter 1 of 
title 9, in any core 
proceeding under section 
157(b) . . . the court may 
hear and determine the 
proceeding, and enter 
appropriate orders and 
judgments, in lieu of referral 
to arbitration.” 
Referred to Judiciary 
Committee. Hearings held. 
Reported out of Committee 
and placed on Senate 
calendar under General 
Orders. 
Competitive and Fair 
Agricultural Markets Act of 
2007, S. 622, 110th Cong. 
(2007). 
Same as prior CFAMA bill. Referred to Agriculture, 
Nutrition, and Forestry 
Committee. 
Competitive and Fair 
Agricultural Markets Act of 
2007, H.R. 2135, 110th 
Cong. (2007). 




Streamlining Act of 2007, 
H.R. 4047, 110th Cong. 
(2007). 
Section 104(b) would have 
made pre-dispute arbitration 
provisions that applied to 
claims between a 
whistleblower and his or her 
employer unenforceable. 





Preservation and Protection 
of 2007, S. 2452, 110th 
Cong. (2007). 
Section 706 would have 
amended the Truth in 
Lending Act to prohibit 
provisions in home 
mortgage loans that “bar a 
consumer from access to any 
judicial procedure, forum, or 
remedy through any court     
. . . .” 
Referred to Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs 
Committee. 
Mortgage Reform and Anti-
Predatory Lending Act of 
2007, H.R. 3915, 110th 
Cong. (2007). 
Section 206 would have 
amended the Truth in 
Lending Act to prohibit 
mandatory arbitration 
provisions in home 
mortgage loans, with the 
exception of reverse 
mortgages, or extensions of 
credit secured by a 
consumer’s principal 
Referred to Committee on 
Banking and Financial 
Services. Reported out of 
Committee. Passed House. 
Referred to Senate 
Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs. 
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dwelling. 
Food, Conservation, and 
Energy Act of 2008, H.R. 
2419, 110th Cong. (2007). 
Section 11005 amends Sec. 
201 of the Packers and 
Stockyards Act of 1921 to 
require poultry and livestock 
contracts to contain 
provisions allowing growers 
and producers to opt out of 
arbitration. It also required 
the governing agency to 
establish regulations that 
would allow contracting 
parties to fully participate in 
the arbitration process. 
Passed House and Senate. 
Veto overridden.320 
Credit Card Safety Star Act 
of 2007, S. 2411, 110th 
Cong. (2007). 
Section 3 would have 
amended the Truth in 
Lending Act to create a 
point rating system for credit 
cards; the system awarded 
one point for agreements 
with no mandatory 
arbitration and that took 
away one point for 
agreements with mandatory 
arbitration. 
Referred to Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs. 
Credit Card Safety Star Act 
of 2008, H.R. 6978, 110th 
Cong. (2008). 
Same as other CCSSA bill. Referred to Committee on 
Banking and Financial 
Services. 
Fairness in Nursing Home 
Arbitration Act of 2008, 
H.R. 6126, 110th Cong. 
(2008). 
Section 2 would have 
prohibited pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements 
between long-term care 
facilities and residents. 
Referred to Judiciary 
Committee’s Subcommittee 




and mark-up session held. 
Forwarded to full 
committee. Committee 
consideration and mark-up 
held. Reported to the full 
House. Placed on the Union 
Calendar. 
Fairness in Nursing Home 
Arbitration Act, S. 2838, 
110th Cong. (2008). 
Same as other FNHAA bill. Referred to (1) Judiciary 
Committee, and (2) Aging 
Committee. Joint hearings 
held in the Aging 
Committee and the 
                                                 
320 See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, 7 U.S.C. § 197c (2006). 
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Judiciary Committee’s 
Subcommittee on Antitrust, 
Competition Policy and 
Consumer Rights. Reported 
to the full Senate by the 
Judiciary Committee. 
Placed on Senate 
Legislative Calendar under 
General Orders. 
Automobile Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 2008, H.R. 
5312, 110th Cong. (2008). 
Section 2 would have 
prohibited pre-dispute 
mandatory arbitration 
provisions in “motor vehicle 
consumer lease or sales 
contracts” and required any 
arbitration awards to 
“include a brief, informal 
discussion of the factual and 
legal basis for the award       
. . . .” 
Referred to Judiciary 
Committee’s Subcommittee 
on Commercial and 
Administrative Law. 
Hearings held. 
Consideration and mark-up 
held. Bill forwarded to full 
Committee. 
Alcohol Franchise Contract 
Arbitration Fairness Act of 
2008, H.R. 7076, 110th 
Cong. (2008). 
Section 2 would have 
prohibited pre-dispute 
mandatory arbitration 
provisions in “alcoholic 
beverage franchise 
contracts,” required post-
dispute arbitrators to follow 
the applicable law, and 
required written 
explanations for arbitration 
awards. 
 
Referred to Judiciary 
Committee. 
Servicemembers Access to 
Justice Act of 2008, S. 
3432, 110th Cong. (2008).  
Section 3 would have 
amended the Uniformed 
Services Employment and 
Reemployment Rights Act 
of 1994 to make mandatory 
arbitration provisions in 
employment contracts 
unenforceable, although 
section 3 includes 
exceptions.  
Referred to Veterans’ 
Affairs Committee. 
Servicemembers Access to 
Justice Act of 2008, H.R. 
7178, 110th Cong. (2008). 
Same as other SAJA bill. Referred to (1) Veteran 
Affairs Committee, and (2) 
Judiciary Committee. 
Civil Rights Act of 2008, S. 
2554, 110th Cong. (2008). 
Same as prior FAIRNESS 
bills. 
Referred to Committee on 
Health, Education, Labor, 
and Pensions. 
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Civil Rights Act of 2008, 
H.R. 5129, 110th Cong. 
(2008). 
Same as prior FAIRNESS 
bills. 
Referred to (1) Judiciary 
Committee’s Subcommittee 
on Constitution, Civil 
Rights and Civil Liberties, 
(2) Education and Labor 
Committee, and (3) 
Transportation and 
Infrastructure Committee’s 
Subcommittee on Aviation. 
Foreclosure Prevention and 
Sound Mortgage Servicing 
Act of 2008, H.R. 5679, 
110th Cong. (2008). 
Section 2 would have 
amended the Real Estate 
Settlement Procedures Act 
of 1974 to prohibit any 
mortgagee of a “covered 
federally related mortgage 
loan” from requiring a 
borrower to agree to 
arbitration as a condition of 
receiving loan modification 
services. 
Referred to Committee on 
Banking and Financial 
Services’ Subcommittee on 
Housing and Community 
Opportunity. Hearings held.  
Foreclosure Prevention Act 
of 2008, S. 2636, 110th 
Cong. (2008). 
Section 423 would have 
amended Section 1334 of 
Title 28 of the U.S. Code to 
say: “Notwithstanding any 
agreement for arbitration 
that is subject to chapter 1 of 
title 9, in any core 
proceeding under section 
157(b) . . . the court may 
hear and determine the 
proceeding, and enter 
appropriate orders and 
judgments, in lieu of referral 
to arbitration.”321 
Introduced in Senate. Placed 




Protection Act, H.R. 6637, 
110th Cong. (2008). 
Section 104(b)(5) would 
have prohibited mandatory 
arbitration between biotech 
companies and purchasers of 
genetically engineered 
plants, animals, or seeds.322 
Referred to (1) Judiciary 
Committee, (2) Energy and 
Commerce Committee’s 
Subcommittee on Health, 
and (3) Agriculture 
Committee’s 
Subcommittees on (a) 
Livestock, Dairy, and 
                                                 
321 This is the same as the provision found in the Helping Families Save Their Homes 
in Bankruptcy Act of 2007, S. 2136, 110th Cong. (2007). 
322 This is the same as the provision in the prior versions of the Genetically 
Engineered Crop and Animal Farm Protection Act. See, e.g., Genetically Engineered Crop 
and Animal Farmer Protection Act of 2002, H.R. 4812, 107th Cong. (2002). 
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Poultry, (b) Horticulture and 
Organic Agriculture, and (c) 
Specialty Crops, Rural 
Development, and Foreign 
Agriculture. 
Arbitration Fairness Act of 
2009, S. 931, 111th Cong. 
(2009). 
The AFA’s broad, stated 
goal is the same as the AFA 
bill from 2007. But the 
substance of the two bills is 
somewhat different. This 
one, for example, drops 
“disputes under statutes 
regulating contracts between 
parties of unequal 
bargaining power” from its 
coverage. 
Referred to Judiciary 
Committee. 
Arbitration Fairness Act of 
2009, H.R. 1020, 111th 
Cong. (2009). 
Same as other 2009 AFA 
bill. 
Referred to Judiciary 
Committee’s Subcommittee 
on Commercial and 
Administrative Law. 
Subcommittee discharged. 
Fairness in Nursing Home 
Arbitration Act of 2009, 
H.R. 1237, 111th Cong. 
(2009). 
Same as prior FNHAA bills. Referred to Judiciary 
Committee’s Subcommittee 
on Commercial and 
Administrative Law. 
Subcommittee discharged. 
Fairness in Nursing Home 
Arbitration Act, S. 512, 
111th Cong. (2009). 
Same as prior FNHAA bills, 
except in section 3.  
Referred to Judiciary 
Committee. 
Consumer Fairness Act of 
2009, H.R. 991, 111th 
Cong. (2009). 
Same as prior CFA bills. Referred to Committee on 




Reduction Act, H.R. 2108, 
111th Cong. (2009). 
Same as prior PMLPRA 
bills. 
Referred to Committee on 
Banking and Financial 
Services. 
Rape Victims Act of 2009, 
S. 2915, 111th Cong. 
(2009). 
Section 3 would make 
arbitration provisions in 
employment contracts 
unenforceable with respect 
to “any claim relating to a 
tort arising out of a rape.” 
Referred to Health, 




Act of 2009, S. 1745, 111th 
Cong. (2009). 
Section 2 would amend the 
Federal Property and 
Administrative Services Act 
of 1949 to make pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses 
unenforceable for disputes 
Referred to Committee on 
Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs. 
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arising under the Act, with 
the exception of arbitration 
and collective bargaining 
agreement.  
Payday Loan Reform Act of 
2009, H.R. 1214, 111th 
Cong. (2009). 
Section 2 would amend the 
Truth in Lending Act to 
prohibit payday lenders from 
including mandatory 
arbitration provisions that 
are “oppressive, unfair, 
unconscionable, or 
substantially in derogation 
of the rights of the 
consumer.”  
Referred to Committee on 
Banking and Financial 
Services. 
Payday Lending Reform 
Act of 2009, H.R. 2563, 
111th Cong. (2009). 
Section 2 would amend the 
Truth in Lending Act to 
prohibit payday lenders from 
including mandatory 
arbitration provisions that 
are “oppressive, unfair, 
unconscionable, or 
substantially in derogation 
of the rights of the 
consumer.” 
Referred to Committee on 
Banking and Financial 
Services. 
Servicemembers Access to 
Justice Act of 2009, S. 263, 
111th Cong. (2009). 
Same as prior 2008 SAJA 
bills. 
Referred to Veterans’ 
Affairs Committee. 
Hearings held. 
Servicemembers Access to 
Justice Act of 2009, H.R. 
1474, 111th Cong. (2009). 
Same as prior 2008 SAJA 
bills. 
Referred to (1) Veterans’ 
Affairs Committee’s 
Subcommittee on Economic 
Opportunity, (2) Armed 
Services Committee’s 
Subcommittee on Military 
Personnel, and (3) Oversight 
and Government Reform 
Committee. 
Whistleblower Protection 
Enhancement Act of 2009, 
H.R. 1507, 111th Cong. 
(2009). 
Section 11 would amend 
Section 315 of the Federal 
Property and Administrative 
Services Act of 1949 to 
make pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses unenforceable for 
disputes arising under the 
Act. 
Referred to (1) Oversight 
and Government Reform 
Committee, and (2) 
Homeland Security 
Committee. Hearings held 
in Oversight and 
Government Reform. 
Credit Card Safety Star Act 
of 2009, S. 900, 111th 
Cong. (2009). 
Same as prior CCSSA bills. Referred to Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs. 
Foreclosure Prevention and Same as prior FPSMSA bill. Referred to Committee on 
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Sound Mortgage Servicing 
Act of 2009, H.R. 3451, 
111th Cong. (2009). 
Banking and Financial 
Services. 
Investor Protection Act of 
2009, H.R. 3817, 111th 
Cong. (2009). 
Section 201 would amend 
the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 and the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 to give 
the SEC the authority to 
prohibit or regulate pre-
dispute mandatory 
arbitration provisions 
applying to disputes arising 
under either Act. 
Referred to Committee on 
Banking and Financial 
Services. Reported out of 
Committee. 
Mortgage Reform and Anti-
Predatory Lending Act, 
H.R. 1728, 111th Cong. 
(2009). 
Relevant provision similar to 
prior MRAPLA bill. 
Referred to Committee on 
Banking and Financial 
Services. Reported out of 
Committee. Passed House 
and referred to Senate 
Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs. 
Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act of 2010, 
H.R. 3326, 111th Cong. 
(2009). 
Section 8116 of the bill 
prohibits the government 
from contracting with 
employers that require 
arbitration of “any claim 
under title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 or any 
tort related to or arising out 
of sexual assault or 
harassment, including 
assault and battery, 
intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, false 
imprisonment, or negligent 
hiring, supervision, or 
retention.” 
Passed in both House and 
Senate. Signed by President 
Obama. 
Consumer Financial 
Protection Agency Act of 
2009, H.R. 3126, 111th 
Cong. (2009). 
Section 125 would give the 
proposed agency the power 
to prohibit or regulate 
mandatory arbitration 
provisions between “covered 
persons” and consumers. 
(1) Referred to Committee 
on Banking and Financial 
Services. Reported to full 
House. (2) Referred to 
Energy and Commerce 
Committee’s Subcommittee 
on Commerce, Trade, and 
Consumer Protection. 
Hearings held by the 
Subcommittee. 
Subcommittee discharged. 
Consideration and mark-up 
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by full Committee. Reported 
to full House. 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2009, 
H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. 
(2010).323 
Sections 10208 and 7201 
function similarly to the 
relevant provisions of the 
Investor Protection Act of 
2009 and the Consumer 
Financial Protection Agency 
Act of 2009. 
Passed both the House and 
the Senate. Signed by 
President Obama. 
Restoring American 
Financial Stability Act of 
2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong. 
(2010). 
Same as the Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act. 
Referred to Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs 
Committee. Reported to full 
Senate. Placed on Calendar 
under General Orders. 
Considered in Full Senate. 
Incorporated into H.R. 4173 




Protection Act, H.R. 5579, 
111th Cong. (2010). 
Same as prior GETFPA bill. Referred to (1) Judiciary 
Committee, (2) Agriculture 
Committee, and (3) Energy 
and Commerce Committee. 
 
Robert C. Bird Miner 
Safety and Health Act of 
2010, H.R. 5663, 111th 
Cong. (2010). 
Section 401 would amend 
section 105(c) of the Federal 
Mine Safety and Health Act 
of 1977 to include a 
provision eliminating 
contracting parties’ ability to 
limit the rights and remedies 
of employees through pre-
dispute arbitration. Section 
701 would make a similar 
change to Section 11 of the 
Occupational Safety and 
Health Act of 1970. 
Referred to (1) Committee 
on Education and Labor. 
Hearings held. 
Consideration and mark-up 
held. Reported out to full 
House. Referred to (2) 
Judiciary Committee. 
Judiciary Committee 
discharged. Placed on Union 
Calendar. 
Robert C. Byrd Mine and 
Workplace Safety and 
Health Act of 2010, S. 
3671, 111th Cong. (2010). 
Same as prior MSHA bill. Referred to Committee on 
Health, Education, Labor, 
and Pensions. 
Mine Safety Accountability 
and Improved Protection 
Act, H.R. 5788, 111th 
Cong. (2010). 
Section 401 would amend 
section 105(c) of the Federal 
Mine Safety and Health Act 
of 1977 to include a 
Referred to Committee on 
Education and Labor’s 
Subcommittee on 
Workforce Protections. 
                                                 
323 This is also known as the Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, 
H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2010) and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2010). 
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provision eliminating 
contracting parties’ ability to 
limit the rights and remedies 
of employees through pre-
dispute arbitration. 
Mine Safety Protection Act 
of 2010, H.R. 6495, 111th 
Cong. (2010). 
Section 401 would amend 
section 105(c) of the Federal 
Mine Safety and Health Act 
of 1977 to include a 
provision eliminating 
contracting parties’ ability to 
limit the rights and remedies 
of employees through pre-
dispute arbitration. 
Failed on motion to suspend 
rules and pass the bill by 
vote of 214-193. 
Taxpayer Abuse Prevention 
Act, H.R. 5693, 111th 
Cong. (2010). 
Same as other 2004 TAPA 
bills. 
Referred to (1) Ways and 
Means Committee, and (2) 
Financial Services 
Committee. 
Taxpayer Abuse Prevention 
Act, S. 585, 111th Cong. 
(2009). 
Same as other 2004 TAPA 
bills. 
Referred to Finance 
Committee. 
Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act of 2011, 
S. 3800, 111th Cong. 
(2010). 
Section 8101 is the same as 
Section 8116 of the DDAA 
of 2010. 
Placed on Senate 
Legislative Calendar under 
General Orders. 
 
